bodied its substance in the famous tenure-of-office act.
Clay supported with some pointed arguments the proposition of the committee, that it should be the duty of the President to communicate to the Senate the reasons for the removals made. “It has been truly said,” he remarked, “that the office was not made for the incumbent. Nor was it created for the incumbent of another office. In both and in all cases, public offices are created for the public; and the people have a right to know why and wherefore one of their servants dismisses another.”
It was then, as it is now, argued that the absolute power of removal must be vested in the Executive, because summary proceedings were sometimes required for the good of the service, and also because the responsibility for removals must definitely rest upon somebody. Concerning this part of the subject, as it had been discussed by Madison in 1789, Clay said: —
“He [Madison] says, ‘The danger, then, merely consists in this: the President can displace from office a man whose merits require that he should be continued in it. What will be the motives which the President can feel for such an abuse of his power?’ What motives! The pure heart of a Washington could have had none; the virtuous head of a Madison could conceive none; but let him ask General Jackson, and he will tell him of motives enough. He will tell him that he wishes his administration to be a unit; that he desires only one
