will to prevail in the executive branch of the government; that he cannot confide in men who opposed his election; that he wants places to reward those who supported it; that the spoils belong to the victors. And what do you suppose are the securities against the abuse of this power on which Mr. Madison relied? ‘In the first place,’ he says, ‘he will be impeachable by the House before the Senate for such an act of maladministration,’ and so forth. Impeachment! It is a scarecrow. Impeach the President for dismissing a receiver or register of the land office, or a collector of the customs!”
Clay went on to show that the other “security” mentioned by Madison, “that the President, after displacing the meritorious officer, could not appoint another person without the concurrence of the Senate,” could not at all be depended upon to prevent the abuse of the removing power by the Executive, because the President alone would exercise the power of nomination, and weary the Senate finally into accepting somebody selected by the Executive.
Clay apparently did not foresee what part the Senate itself would play in the development of “spoils” politics. At that period, indeed, the procuring of offices, the manipulation of the patronage, had not yet become an absorbing occupation among legislators. It was still thought that the legitimate business of statesmanship concerned other things. The “courtesy of the Senate,” which, in acting upon nominations made by the President,
