Opinion of Alito, J.
v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 582 U. S. 255, 263 (2017).
Despite these many references to federalism in due process decisions, there is a significant obstacle to addressing those concerns through the Fourteenth Amendment here: we have never held that a State’s assertion of jurisdiction unconstitutionally intruded on the prerogatives of another State when the defendant had consented to jurisdiction in the forum State. Indeed, it is hard to see how such a decision could be justified. The Due Process Clause confers a right on “person[s],” Amdt. 14, §1, not States. If a person voluntarily waives that right, that choice should be honored. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U. S., at 703; ante, at 2–3 (Jackson, J., concurring).
B
1
The federalism concerns that this case presents fall more naturally within the scope of the Commerce Clause.[1] “By its terms, the Commerce Clause grants Congress the power ‘[t]o regulate Commerce … among the several States.’ ” Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U. S. 429, 440 (1978) (quoting Art. I, §8, cl. 3). But this Court has long held that the Clause includes a negative component, the so-called dormant Commerce Clause, that “prohibits state laws that unduly restrict interstate commerce.” Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers Assn. v. Thomas, 588 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2019) (slip op., at 6–7); see, e.g., Cooley v. Board of
- ↑ Analyzing these concerns under the Commerce Clause has the additional advantage of allowing Congress to modify the degree to which States should be able to entertain suits involving out-of-state parties and conduct. If Congress disagrees with our judgment on this question, it “has the authority to change the … rule” under its own Commerce power, subject, of course, to any other relevant constitutional limit. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 585 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (slip op., at 17–18); see also Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U. S. 761, 769–770 (1945).
