Opinion of Alito, J.
Cooley v. Board of, 12 How. 299, 318–319 (1852); Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245, 252 (1829).
While the notion that the Commerce Clause restrains States has been the subject of “thoughtful critiques,” the concept is “deeply rooted in our case law,” Tennessee Wine, 588 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 7), and vindicates a fundamental aim of the Constitution: fostering the creation of a national economy and avoiding the every-State-for-itself practices that had weakened the country under the Articles of Confederation. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U. S. 322, 325–326 (1979); Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U. S. 324, 335–336 (1989). The Framers “might have thought [that other provisions] would fill that role,” but “at this point in the Court’s history, no provision other than the Commerce Clause could easily do the job.” Tennessee Wine, 588 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8).[1]
- ↑ In the past, the Court recognized that the Import-Export Clause, Art. I, §10, cl. 2, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Art. IV, §2, might restrict state regulations that interfere with the national economy. See, e.g., Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 445–449 (1827) (reading Import-Export Clause to prohibit state laws imposing duties on “importations from a sister State”); Almy v. California, 24 How. 169, 175 (1861) (applying Import-Export Clause to invalidate state law taxing gold and silver shipments between States); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385, 396, and n. 26 (1948) (observing that the Privileges and Immunities Clause guarantees out-of-state citizens the right to do business in a State on equal terms with state citizens (citing Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418 (1871))). But the Court has since narrowed the scope of these provisions. See Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 136–137 (1869) (holding that the Import-Export Clause applies only to international trade); Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 U. S. 648, 656 (1981) (observing that “the Privileges and Immunities Clause is inapplicable to corporations” (citing Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U. S. 537, 548–550 (1928))). Whether or not these restrictive interpretations are correct as an original matter, they are entrenched. Unless we overrule them, we must look elsewhere if “a national economic union unfettered by state-imposed limitations on commerce” is to be preserved. Healy, 491 U. S., at 336.
