Cite as 795 F.Supp. 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
an initial matter, Peacock’s countercomplaint makes no effort to identify a time frame for the alleged narcotics transactions. Typical of Peacock’s pleading is the allegation that “Michael Paolercio was observed in the possession of at least four ounces of cocaine, and distributed at least four ounces of cocaine to MAJ’s employees” (¶ 127). That statement not only fails to identify the source of the observation, but to provide even an approximate date—whether day, month, or year—for the alleged possession and or distribution. In fact, the only dates mentioned with respect to the alleged narcotics offenses are the introductory observation that MAJ began offering the unlawful inducements “starting in the early 1980’s” (¶ 113), and that a certain Gus Pappas allegedly supplied MAJ with cocaine during the period of “at least” 1983–84 (¶ 128).
In short, we find that Peacock’s generalized allegations that MAJ engaged in an unspecified number of narcotics violations over an imprecise period of as many as 12 years violates even the more lenient rule 8(a)’s requirement that the pleadings provide MAJ with “notice” of the claims against it. Although, as we discuss in Part III infra, we will allow Peacock the opportunity to replead this claim, the alleged narcotics offenses cannot serve as a predicate for Peacock’s RICO violation as set forth in this amended countercomplaint.
The Mann Act Violations.
Peacock next attempts to meet the predicate act requirement by alleging violations of the Mann Act. That act prohibits any person from
knowingly transport[ing] any individual in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States, with intent that such individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense …
18 U.S.C. § 2421 (Supp.1992) (as amended November 7, 1986). As was the case with the narcotics violations, the Mann Act violation must be “indictable” to serve as a predicate for the RICO claim. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
The allegations underlying this aspect of the counterclaim are set forth in paragraphs 119, 120 and 121 of the amended countercomplaint. Although we have construed each of them as generously as is possible, we find that none can support a claim under the Mann Act.
Beginning with the allegation in paragraph 120, Peacock states that on one (unspecified) occasion, “members of the Million Dollar Club were gathered for a celebratory party at which they were advised that prostitutes had been brought in from Paris.” Even assuming that these Parisian prostitutes had been transported in foreign commerce, however, this allegation fails to state a claim under the Mann Act because it does not charge any of the counterclaim defendants with having caused their transport. Peacock next alleges in paragraph 119 that “[u]pon information and belief, at least some of the prostitutes provided by Michael and Anthony Paolercio on behalf of MAJ [at various parties] were brought in interstate or foreign commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421.” That allegation must fail, however, because it states a pure legal conclusion and merely parrots the requirements of the statute instead of providing notice of the complained of conduct.
Peacock’s final allegation with respect to the Mann Act gives us greater pause. In paragraph 121, Peacock asserts: “Upon information and belief, on other occasions, members of the Million Dollar Club were brought to Connecticut by Michael Paolercio, to a brothel he frequented in that state.” MAJ argues that this allegation is inadequate because it states only that the customers were brought across state lines, rather than the prostitutes themselves. Our reading of the statute, however, suggests that it is gender-neutral, meaning that it punishes the interstate transportation of either men or women, and that it is meant to punish anyone who transports those individuals with the intent that they “engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense.” Assuming that the customers’ sexual conduct could give rise to some other criminal
