charge, therefore, it is conceivable that Peacock’s allegation could state a violation of the Mann Act.
Despite that conceptual possibility, we are unable to find that the allegation—as currently pleaded—is sufficient. As was the case with the alleged narcotics violations, Peacock’s pleading with respect to the provision of prostitutes makes no reference to dates of occurrence. Instead, the countercomplaint states only that the unlawful inducements, and this term covers both the cocaine charges and the prostitution charges, were provided “starting in the early 1980’s.” ¶ 113. While this lack of specificity has consequences in terms of the notice it affords MAJ, it has particular relevance here because of a November 7, 1986 amendment to the Mann Act. Prior to that amendment, the statute punished only those who transported “any woman or girl.” In light of the fact that MAJ’s transportation of (presumably) male customers would be actionable only if it occurred after the effective date of the amendment, a more detailed pleading is necessary to determine whether it has stated a claim under the Mann Act.
As the above discussion suggests, none of Peacock’s allegations are currently adequate to state an “indictable” violation of the Mann Act. Although we will grant Peacock leave to amend the allegation in paragraph 121, at present, the Mann Act claims may not serve as a predicate for the RICO violation.
The Mail Fraud Charges.
The third type of predicate acts asserted in the RICO counterclaim are various acts of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1984). The essential elements of a mail fraud violation are: (1) a scheme to defraud an intended victim; (2) of money or property; and (3) use of the mails to further the scheme. See United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 461 (2d Cir.1991). In this instance, the claim of mail fraud is founded on allegations that MAJ mailed “at least thirteen fraudulent applications” for copyright registration to the Register of Copyrights, on at least four different dates spanning from “shortly before” December 22, 1986 to “shortly before” October 19, 1988. See ¶¶ 133–139.
In urging this Court to dismiss the mail fraud claims, MAJ maintains that even assuming it engaged in a scheme to defraud the Copyright Office, Peacock may not assert a violation because it was not deceived by the scheme. As support for this proposition, MAJ relies on dicta from two Second Circuit cases suggesting that the party injured must also be the party deceived to fall within the compass of § 1341. See Corcoran v. American Plan Corp., 886 F.2d 16, 19–20 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Evans, 844 F.2d 36, 39–40 (2d Cir.1988) (noting that “If a scheme to defraud must involve the deceptive obtaining of property, the conclusion seems logical that the deceived party must lose some money or property”); see also McEvoy Travel Bureau, Inc. v. Heritage Travel, Inc., 904 F.2d 786, 794 n. 13 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, – U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 536, 112 L.Ed.2d 546 (1990) (citing the Corcoran dicta with approval).
In response to MAJ’s contention that there must be a convergence of the party deceived and injured for the mail fraud statute to apply, Peacock cites Shaw v. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc., 726 F.Supp. 969 (S.D.N.Y.1989). In Shaw, Judge Conner distinguished Evans and Corcoran on the grounds that in those cases, the plaintiff was the party deceived and not the party injured, whereas in the case before him, the plaintiff was injured but not deceived. Id. at 973. Judge Conner found that distinction to be significant, and concluded that “A plaintiff who is injured as a proximate result of fraud should be able to recover regardless of whether he or a third party is the one deceived.” Id. Peacock urges us to follow Judge Conner’s approach and conclude that because it was injured by MAJ’s fraudulent scheme, it may assert a violation of the mail fraud statute regardless of whether or not it was deceived.
Although we acknowledge that the issue is an important and potentially dispositive one, we base our decision on an alternative rationale. For the reasons that follow, we find that Peacock has failed to demonstrate
