412 CRITICAL NOTICES : other" (p. 49). "Which it is that must surrender to the other, is obvious. For Science at any rate is not a mere " possibility " ; it is a great reality. " Science is actual knowledge of a noumenal universe, and therefore refutes by its bare existence the pheno- menism which denies the possibility of such knowledge " (p. 79). The theory implied in the scientific method " can be overthrown only by overthrowing the scientific method itself". That theory Mr. Abbot calls " Scientific Realism or Relationism," or the prin- ciple of the " objectivity of relations, 1 ' as opposed to the philo- sophical " subjectivity of relations ". In the concession and interpretation of this principle consists the required " revolution " in philosophy. For, this principle of "objectivity" once conceded by Philosophy, the foundation is taken from every "pheno- menistic" theory. Just as the " necessary corollary " of Subjec- tivism is " the separability of phenomena and noumena," the " necessary corollary " of the Objectivism of science is ' ' the insepara- bility of noumena and phenomena ". The distinction becomes one of thought, not of reality ; and " the only utility in retaining the distinction at all is to mark the distinction between complete and incomplete knowledge noumena being taken to denote things- in-themselves as they exist in all the complexity of their objective attributes and relations, and phenomena being taken to denote these same things-in-themselves so far only as they are knuwn in their objective attributes and relations " (p. 53). This vindication of the objective standpoint of Science and this account of the real nature of the distinction between the noumenon and phenomenon are excellent. The principle of " Relatiouism," if properly understood, is undeniably true, and must supersede all merely " subjective " principles. We cannot believe in " a noumenal world " which possesses in itself " a non- relational or chaotic constitution," and which therefore must " remain for ever unintelligible per * ". But, in order to be philosophically valuable, " Relationism " must be led up to by the pathway of Criticism. Philosophy cannot simply take up the standpoint of Science. The two cannot be "identified". For their attitude towards experience is different. Here again a more thorough appreciation of the meaning of Criticism would have saved the author from an extreme position. Criticism is the interpretation and theory of that Experience which Science simply takes for granted, not the invalidating of it in any respect essential to Science. Philosophy must analyse the ultimate fact of know- ledge, and exhibit its inner constitution : it cannot, like Science, simply accept the fact in all its complexity. It is only by thus submitting the distinctions of scientific knowledge to philosophy that they can be overcome. The " Noumenism" of Science, for example, is not the final or philosophical Noumenism. It is said by Mr. Abbot to "repudiate the fundamental dualism" of Phenomenism, but it is only for the other dualism of Thought and Being, Things and Relations. E.g., "it is the great merit of
