Page:Mind (Old Series) Volume 11.djvu/414

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F. E. ABBOT, SCIENTIFIC THEISM. 413 the new Scientific Kealism to treat things and relations as two totally distinct orders of objective reality, indissolubly united and mutually dependent, yet for all that utterly unlike in themselves (p. 128). The theory is thus landed in hopeless contradiction. For we are told two pages further on that " it may be taken as a generally conceded truth that nothing is intelligible except rela- tions," and again (p. 135) that " nothing is known of the universe per se except its immanent relational constitution ". If these statements be true, they take us back to the standpoint of " Phenomenism," and we must still conceive the Noumenon as an 'unknown and unknowable' thing-in-itself behind phenomena. Such contradictions serve to carry home the lesson that the only way to arrive at a satisfactory theory of the Noumenon, or indeed of Knowledge as a whole, is by submitting to philosophical analysis the prime characteristic of Knowledge and of Eeality alike, namely, Relation. Mr. Abbot has done well to seize upon this, and to signalise its supreme importance. But he has not realised its essential nature. He recognises indeed that " rela- tions as such are the specific and only direct objects of the intellect or understanding " (p. 90). Yet he conceives of Know- ledge as "an objective synthesis of real relations in a universe independent for its existence on human consciousness " (p. 80). But "relations'" are not independent of consciousness, and if they constitute the world of knowledge, that world is no less dependent upon consciousness. Eelation is thought or conscious- ness. Hence Mr. Abbot's position is virtually that of Idealism : and what prevents his realising this is the above-mentioned mis- conception of Idealism as a necessarily individualistic or even sensationalistic theory of knowledge. It is on this philosophical foundation that Mr. Abbot builds his theistic argument. Its "corner-stone" he calls the principle of " the infinite intelligibility of the universe " which follows from its "immanent relational constitution". Now " that which either discovers or creates relational systems or constitutions" is intelli- gence. Therefore the universe itself, being "infinitely intelligible, must be likewise infinitely intelligent". "The intelligibility or relational system of the universe, considered as an effect, must originate in the intelligence or creative understanding of the uni- verse, considered as a cause " (p. 151). " The universe per se is an infinite self-conscious intellect, which, though infinitely removed in degree, is yet essentially identical in kind with the human intellect. This result, then, is the constitutive principle of Scientific Theism ; and I see no way to escape it, except by repudiating the scientific method itself" (p. 156). But a con- sideration of the nature of the universe leads to a closer definition of the theistic idea. Its characteristic feature is system ; but a per- fect system is an organism : therefore the universe must be con- ceived as an "infinite organism". This conception, again, leads to the true view of evolution. " It is shallow and poverty-struck