Page:NTSB RAR-72-5.pdf/32

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inspection report indicated that the No. 2 engine was shut down and that the reverser was blocked. This should have warned the repair forces sufficiently about the precautions taken by the forces at New Orleans

Under 49 CFR 230.203(a), a defect, if it constitutes a violation of FRA regulations, must be repaired before the unit is again used and proper notation must be made on the loco- motive inspection report to indicate that such repairs have been made. As required, a notation was made and the repoit was approved; how- ever, the pin had not been removed from the reverser. Since no exceptions were noted on the report, the locomotive was accepted as ready for service. While the notations on the report may be considered adequate by the ICRR, the repairman;s notation does not fully state what was done and one must assume that the pin was removed from the reveiser.

A locomotive unit, after being repaired, should be tested to determine if it is suitable for service before being moved from the repair shop. These tests should determine the workability of the unit in general as well as the repaired part in this case, either such tests were not performed or they were inadequate to detect the cutout No 2 motor circuit.

The unit was then moved from the repair shop to the ready track where it was placed as the fourth unit of the locomotive consist and tested for serviceability. The sequence test per- formed on the locomotive should have been designed to test separately each motor circuit if this test had been designed and performed properly, the blocked reverser on the No 2 motor circuit of unit 4031 should have been detected. No such condition was reported.

Under existing arrangements the engineer is not required to test and cannot test the various warning circuits provided on the locomotive. He must, therefore, assume that all circuits are functioning properly when he takes over the operation of the locomotive at the initial terminal.

G Adequacy of Federal Regulations Covering the Operation of Locomotives

There appears to be a deficiency in the Federal regulations relevant to this case.

49 CFR 230 201(d) requiies that means shall be provided to indicate either slipping or sliding driving wheels Section 230.262 allows the continuation in service of units with an engine shut down because of defects if a distinctive tag giving reason for the shutdown is attached conspicuously near the engine starting control until repairs have been made.

When unit 4031 was operated between New Orleans and Chicago the wheel-slip indicator was inoperative on the rear truck when the No. 2 engine was shut down and tagged in compliance with Section 230.262 Being inoperative, the wheelslip device would not indicate the slipping or sliding of the driving wheels of No. 2 engine There are no provisions in Section 230.201(d) to permit the operation of a locomotive unit without an operative wheel-slip device

The argument has been advanced that when power is removed from driving wheels, as in this case, they me no longer driving wheels and do not requiie an indication of slipping or sliding. If this be true, the 1egulation is deficient because the wheels, although not being powered at the time, still possess all of the possibilities of sliding.

If the interpretation of Section 230 201(d) is that driving wheels must be protected whether power is supplied or not, then the operation of the locomotive from New Orleans to Chicago on June 7, and the operation of locomotive from Chicago to Tonti on June 10, 1971, was in violation of the regulation.

A locomotive consist provided with the same type of wheel-slip device as used in unit 4031 does not have effective wheel-slip protection when operated with the throttle in idle position, even though all motels and circuits are functional. A train moving on a descending grade could travel many miles with an inef-

fective wheel-slip device. If a driving wheel

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