Page:NTSB RAR-72-5.pdf/33

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locked at such a time, an accident similar to this one could occur

Although Federal regulations require a means of indicating slipping or sliding wheels, they do not require that the engineer determine whether the device is operative before leaving the initial terminal. The engineer in this case n and on other similar locomotives - had no means of checking the operability of that safety device. In contrast, in aviation there are requirements and means for checking safety devices and warning circuits before takeoff.

With the exception of the airbrake test, and trainscontrol test where applicable, Federal regulations do not require an inspection or test of the locomotive before leaving the initial terminal The 24shour requirement (49 CF R 230.203(a)) does not specify what should be inspected; however, the presumption is that when the inspector approves the locomotive for service, all conditions comply with regulations Most of the conditions required by regulations are not determined to be in compliance by the 24-hour inspection, and failure of parts in service is the only indication of non-compliance.

If the intent of Section 230 262 is to provide a means of moving a locomotive unit with a defective internal combustion engine to a repair shop, this intent should be stated clearly. If the intent of the regulation is to provide a means for operating a unit for an extended period of time with a defective engine, then means should be required to provide for its safe operation and to provide for continued use of the warning systems. The movement of unit 4031 from New Orleans to Woodcrest shop in Chicago with the No. 2 engine shut down was apparently done for economic reasons. The regulation does not require an adequate level of safety to allow for the movement of locomotives in regular service

Whereas the regulations require the use of a wheel-slip device, the use of a pneumatic control switch (PC) or of a safety control device (dead-man) is not required Accidents have been caused by the lack of these devices or by their inadequate installation or maintenance if a PC switch and a dead—man control, as well as the other warning systems provided on the unit, are necessary for the safe operation of the loco- motive, then these devices and their installation and test should be required by the CFR so that adequate protection can be provided for the operation of the train.

During the investigation of this accident the Safety Board brought to the attention of the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) the deficiencies and conflicts in the rules to deter- mine if any decisions had been made since the adoption of the rules to clarify this situation. FRA stated that the interpretation of rule 230 201(d), as made in the past, was that only those wheels receiving power were considered to be driving wheels FRA also stated that the rule as written is not clear and does not provide for all contingencies. The FRA inferred that rule-making procedures would be initiated to eliminate the conflict in the regulations and to provide the necessary degree of safety for train operation.

H The Operation of the Train

Although the first engine crew assigned to the locomotive reported to the relieving crew at Champaign that the No 2 engine of unit 4031 was not loading, the second fireman apparently assumed that the No 2 engine was loading properly after the diesel engine increased speed when the engineer advanced the throttle and after he saw that the engine regulators indicated that the engine was loading.

The load meter in the control compartment reflects only the amount of electrical current being supplied to the traction motors in the No. 1 circuit. if separate load meters were available for each motor or for each circuit, the distribu- tion of power could quickly be discerned and a nonfuntioning circuit would be apparent.

Although the train was inspected by its own crew, by the crew of another train going in the opposite direction, and by the operator at Edgewood, the sliding wheels were not detected.

A train running at high speeds stirs up a cloud of

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