Page:NTSB RAR-73-5.pdf/39

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28. Because of the improper welds, the collision posts of the Highliner car did not meet the shear requirements of the Federal regulations.

29. It is probably technically feasible to design commuter cars to withstand crashes at moderate speeds without fatal injuries to the passengers.

30. Although the Highliner cars were financed with Federal assistance, the design of the cars was not subjected to a review for compliance with Federal regulations by FRA or to a safety review by UMTA.

31. FRA had no program to insure that design of new equipment complied with Federal regulations before the equipment was put in service. Instead, the FRA relied upon voluntary compliance.


IV. PROBABLE CAUSE

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the reverse movement of train 416 without flag protection into a previously vacated signal block and the failure of the engineer of train 720, while operating faster than the prescribed speed, to perceive the train ahead in time to avoid the collision. Ambiguous rules which caused confusion among employees regarding the necessity to flag within automatic-block signal system limits and the reduced importance of flagging in suburban service implied by the management's failure to enforce Rules 7, 35, 99, 896, and 1003 also contributed to the accident.

Contributing to the high incidence of fatality was the overriding of the underframe of the Highliner car by the older car, which allowed the older car to telescope the Highliner car.