Page:NTSB RAR-73-5.pdf/40

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been validated.

- 35 -

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

The National Transportation Safety Board has previously issued interim recommendations concerning this accident to the Illinois Central Gulf Railroad, the Federal Railroad Administration, the Chicago South Suburban Mass Transit District, and the Urban Mass Transportation Administration. (See Appendices F, G, and H, respectively.)

The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that:

1. The Illinois Central Gulf Railroad ensure that its employees understand and comply with its operating rules. In order to do this, the ICG should improve its training program by developing:

(a) Books of standard interpretations of its rules in situations met both routinely and only occasionally to provide a basis for better use of the rule book in instruction; and

(b) A system of regularly testing the ability of employees to interpret actions required in specific operating situations. (Recommendation No. R-73-28)

2. The Illinois Central Gulf Railroad review its organization systematically to ensure that safety is covered adequately in all interactions of equipment, personnel, rules, and procedures. For example, the Highliner design does not allow the conductor to use the intercom and emergency brake valve from the rear of the car, which is the logical location for supervising a reverse movement. (Recommendation No. R-73-29)

3. The Federal Railroad Administration and the Urban Mass Transportation Administration cooperate in sponsoring an independent study to justify or disprove the need for a requirement that high-speed commuter train operations be governed by some form of automatic train-control system or some special procedures that will prevent a collision of two trains. (Recommendation No. R-73-30)