as to any article of commerce is equivalent to its declaration that the importation of that article into the states shall be unrestricted.”
But subsequent to the decision of Leisy v. Hardin, and prior to the sales of liquor made by the defendants, congress took action in the premises, by passing an act commonly known as the “Wilson Law.” This statute provides “that all fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquors transported into any state or territory, or remaining therein for use, consumption, sale, or storage therein, shall, upon arrival in such state or territory, be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such state or territory enacted in the exercise of its police powers, to the same extent, arid in the same manner, as though such liquor or liquids had been produced in such state or territory, and shall not be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in original packages or otherwise.” Under this statute imported liquor, however introduced into the state, is placed under local control, to the same extent as liquors of domestic production. On crossing the boundry line of a state, the supreme authority has declared by this enactment that interstate liquor ceases to be an object of federal protection and control, and becomes mingled with the mass of property within the state, and, in common with all such property, is subject to local police regulations. It has been contended, but not in this case, that the Wilson bill is invalid, because it in terms delegates to the states the power to regulate interstate commerce in liquor, and thereby violates the provision of the federal constitution, which confers such power upon congress alone. Counsel in this case insist that the act, if valid, is only permissive to the states, and until a state has acted under it and passed new laws, or re-enacted existing statutes, that the provisions of the Wilson bill are inoperative, and that the pre-existing prohibitory legislation of the state is void as to imported liquor sold in the original package. This position is supported by a decision of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kansas, in a decision rendered by Judges Philips and Foster. In re Rahrer, 43 Fed. Rep. 556. But precisely the opposite view is taken, and the validity of the Wilson law, and, also, of the pre-existing pro-
