hibitory legislation of the state of Iowa, is fully sustained by able opinions promulgated by the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of Iowa, and also for the east- ern district of Arkansas. The opinions are respectively by Judge Shiras and Judge Caldwell. They are reported in 43 Fed. Rep. 655, 761. We deem it unnecessary to quote the lauguage or reproduce the reasoning of these cases. They are already familiar to the profession. It will suffice to state that we concur in the conclusions reached in the cases cited, and hold that the Wilson law is a valid enactment, and is not a delegation, but an exertion, of legislative power of congress. Such legislation only indicates the time and the event which determines when intoxicating liquor ceases to be an article of interstate commerce and becomes mingled with the mass of property in the state, and thereby subject to local control. We hold that the prohibitory law of the state as originally passed could not have been enforced against any imported liquor while the same remained within the protection of federal authority, and that in this respect the law continues unchanged. It cannot now be enforced as against any imported liquor which has not passed beyond federal protection. A majority of this court is of the opinion that both the Wilson law and the prohibitory law of this state are valid enactments, and that the final arbitrator of the question—the supreme court of the United States—will so rule at a day not distant; and we are unanimous in viewing this case as one in which a subordinate court should give the benefit of the doubt, if any, in favor of the constitutionality of the laws in question. To do so is only to observe a firmly-settled rule of statutory construction. Cooley, Const. Lim. 220.
We shall consider only one further question. It arises out of the fourth conclusion of law as found by the district court, which is as follows: “That to justify the court in adjudging the premises a public nuisance it must be shown by clear and positive evidence that said premises were used by said defendant Fraser as a resort for drinking intoxicating liquors, and that such liquors were so drank on said premises by and with his knowledge and consent.” This is error. Section 13 of the act declares that “all places where intoxicating liquors are sold,
