Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 1).pdf/519

in only a different form. Said the court in Clark v. School-Dist. No 1, 78 Ill. 474: “The authority given to school directors by statute to 'appropriate to the purchase of libraries and apparatus any surplus fund after all necessary school expenses are paid,' is a limitation of their power to make such purchases to the circumstances named, and is an implied restriction of any power to purchase generally on credit. A purchase of such articles by the school directors on a credit when it does not appear that there were any surplus funds after all necessary school expenses were paid applicable to such purchase, is void, and there is no contract implied by law to pay for articles thus purchased arising from their receipt and use. The only remedy of the seller under such circumstances is to reclaim the property itself." See also, Dickinson v. City of Poughkeepsie, 75 N. Y. 65, cited with approval in People v. Gleason, 121 N. Y, 631-634, 25 N. E. Rep. 4; Addis v. City of Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. St. 379. In Farmers' etc., Bank v. School-Dist. No. 53, (Dak.) 42 N. W. Rep. 767, the court, referring to this statute said: "School-districts are corporations created for special purposes, and have only such powers as are specially granted by the legislative enactment, and those that are necessarily implied to accomplish the objects for which they are created. The specification of these powers by the statute under which they are organized restrains them from the exercise of other powers than those granted, and such as must be implied to enable them to effect the object of the grant, and operates to restrain them from the exercise of other powers; and in the discharge of their duties and the exercise of the powers granted they are governed and restrained by the provisions of the law under which they are created. Where the law specifically defines their powers the legal presumption is that they are prohibited from the exercise of any others than those absolutely essential to enable them to accomplish the purposes of the grant." Said the court in Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 220: "What is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as what is expressed." In City of Evansville v. State, 118 Ind. 426, 21 N. E. Rep. 267, the court states it as well settled that "a law may be within the inhibition of the constitution as well by implication as by expression."