It will be noticed that nowhere are the inhabitants generally authorized to build school houses. They have power to vote a limited tax for that purpose, and the district board shall build such school house as the inhabitants designate at a district meeting, not on the credit of the district, not by anticipating its revenues for years to come, but only out of funds then actually provided for that purpose. This is all the authority the inhabitants possess, and every tax-payer has a right to insist that it is all they shall exercise, and that his property shall not be burdened because of the receipt of value against this wise restrictive policy of the law. It is not strictly accurate to assert that a municipal corporation is invariably benefited to the extent of value received when that value has assumed the form of immovable property. It would be far from the truth to state that a school district poor in treasury and in the taxable property of its inhabitants, and requiring but a small school house to accommodate its pupils, would be benefited to the extent of its value by the erection of such a school building as would be a credit to some great metropolis. Private business corporations, when transcending their powers in the purchase of property, should be held responsible for the actual value of the property received, because, being organized for purposes of trade, they have power to dispose of such property in the same manner as individuals. School houses are not erected for sale or for speculation, and the benefit to the district is not to be determined by any market price, but by their value for use for the specific purpose for which they were erected. For such purpose a school house costing many thousands of dollars might be no more valuable than one costing only as many hundred. There is, therefore, a good reason for making a distinction between private and municipal corporations in determining whether an act in excess of power is prohibited in the sense that it cannot form the basis of a claim even for value received. We do not, however, wish to be understood that in every case, and under all circumstances, no recovery can be had on quantum meruit where a contract of a muncipality is in excess of its powers. We decide merely this case. While satisfied that the defense which we sustain ‘will work justice in this case, we are not unmindful of the fact that
