Page:North Dakota Reports (vol. 2).pdf/430

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404
NORTH DAKOTA REPORTS.

virtue of a contract, or by operation of law.” From this it appears that only such claims as are against “a trustee” can be united in an action against a trustee, assuch. It follows that unless the $75 note transaction is a claim against the defendant as a trustee it cannot be united in the same action with the other claim against the defendant in that capacity. If the facts as pleaded in the third cause of action show a trust relation with respect to the $75 note transaction, whereby a claim in plaintiff's favor against the defendant as trustee is established, then it follows that the third cause of action is properly united with the others; otherwise such note transaction is improperly united. We are entirely clear that the facts pleaded as a third cause of action do not show a claim against defendant as a trustee. It is not claimed by respondent’s counsel that a trust relation is created in express terms, with respect to the note, by any averments found in either the first or second causes of action; nor is the note, or any note, referred to as a part of the personal property which, on May 22, 1885, was on the farm, and delivered to the defendant in trust. Such personal property is carefully enumerated, and its value stated in the second cause of action; but no allusion is made to any note. But respondent’s counsel contends that certain general language, occurring in both the first and second causes of action, fairly construed, is broad enough to create between the parties in plaintiff's favor a general agency, or a trusteeship covering not only the farm and the property and business connected therewith, but including as well all other property and all other business of the plaintiff, whether turned over or alluded to in terms or not. The language referred to is similar as used in both the first and second causes of action, but is stated more strongly and favorably to the plaintiff in the first cause of action as follows: “Plaintiff let defeudant have possession of said farm, together with all the said personal property; and for the same consideration, and no other, gave to defendant the entire management of all his business affairs during the period of his imprisonment.” It is elementary that broad and sweeping grants of authority, such as that above quoted, will not operate to create an agency which covers and includes all the