principal’s business of every name and variety; but, on the contrary, such general investiture of authority will be strictly confined to the particular kind of business which is actually placed in the agent’s hands for control and management. Civil Code, § 1360; Comp. Laws, § 3983. But, should we concur with the views of plaintiff's counsel, and hold that the language of the complaint found in the first and second causes of action is broad enough to create an agency and trusteeship in the defendant, embracing all the business affairs of the plaintiff of every name and nature, we cannot see how such a construction could save the pleading. To constitute a claim against a trustee it is not sufficient to aver generally that at a time stated, and in a particular manner, the defendant was made a trustee, and that the plaintiff is the beneficiary of the trust. The allegations must go further, and show affirmatively that the trustee as such did something; for example, in this case, that defendant, in his trustee capacity, took possession of and collected the note. No such averments are in the complaint. On the contrary, the pleader has been studious to exclude that theory. The purpose to exclude such a theory appears both directly and indirectly. In the first place, if the note transaction is not in fact an independent matter and cause of action, it follows that the rules of pleading will not permit it to be set out separately as an independent cause of action, as it is in fact set out and pleaded. Again, if it were supposed for plaintiff's benefit—the fact not being stated—that defendant as a matter of fact took possession of the note under color of the trust arrangement set out in the first and second causes of action, it would follow that the plaintiff could introduce evidence of such fact under the allegations of the first and second causes of action, and, if they are not broad enough, they could be amended; bence the third cause of action would, upon this theory of the case, be superfluous as well as bad pleading. But the language of the third cause of action, when the words used are construed according to their natural and ordinary meaning, imports clearly that the note transaction was disconnected from the trust pleaded in the other parts of the complaint, and stands upon an independent state of facts. After describing
