Chapter II. General Survey Of The Most Important Views Hitherto Held Concerning The Principle Of Sufficient Reason.
§ 6. First Statement of the Principle and Distinction between Two of its Meanings.
A MORE or less accurately defined, abstract expression for so fundamental a principle of all knowledge must have been found at a very early age; it would, therefore, be difficult, and besides of no great interest, to determine where it first appeared. Neither Plato nor Aristotle have formally stated it as a leading fundamental principle, although both often speak of it as a self-evident truth. Thus, with a naivete which savours of the state of innocence as opposed to that of the knowledge of good and of evil, when compared with the critical researches of our own times, Plato says: άναγκαίον, πάντα τύ γιγνομενα διά τινα αίτίαν γίγνεσφαι πῶς γάρ ὰν χωρίς τούτων γιγνοιτο; [1] (necesse est, quœcunque fiunt, per aliquam causam fieri: quomodo enim absque ea fierent?) and then again: πᾶν δὲ τὸ γιγνόμενα ύπ αίτίον τινὸς ὲξ ὰνάγκης γίγνεοφαι παντί γαρ ἁδύνατον χωρίς αίτίον γένεσιν σχείν [2] (quidquid gignitur, ex aliqua causa
- ↑ Platon, "Phileb." p. 240, ed Bip. "It is necessary that all which arises, should arise by some cause; for how could it arise otherwise ? " [Tr.'s add.]
- ↑ Ibid. "Timseus," p. 302. " All that arises, arises necessarily from some cause; for it is impossible for anything to come into being without cause." [Tr.'s add.]
