necessario gignitur: sine causa enim oriri quidquam, impossibile est). At the end of his book "De fato," Plutarch cites the following among the chief propositions of the Stoics : μάλιοτα μὲν καί πρῶτον είναι δὁξειε τὸ μηδὲν ὰναιτιως γίγνεοφαι, ὰλλὰ κατὰ προηγονμενας αίτίας [1] (maxime id primum esse videbitur, nihil fieri sine causa, sed omnia causis antegressis ).
In the "Analyt. post." i. 2, Aristotle states the principle of sufficient reason to a certain degree when he says: επίσταοθαι δὲ οίόμεθα ἔκαστον ἁπλῶς, ὀταν τὴν τ' αίτίαν οίόμεθα γινώσκειν, δι' ἣν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἔστιν, ὀτι ἐκείνον αίτίαἐστίν, καί μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τούτο ᾶλλως είναι. (Scire autem putamus unamquamque rem simpliciter, quum putamus causam cognoscere, propter quum res est, ejusque rei causam esse, nee posse eam aliter se habere.) [2] In his "Metaphysics," moreover, he already divides causes, or rather principles, ἀρχαί, into different kinds, [3] of which he admits eight ; but this division is neither profound nor precise enough. He is, nevertheless, quite right in saying, πασῶν μἐν ούν κοινὸν τῶν ἀρχῶν, τὸ πρῶτον είναι, ὁθεν ἢ γίνεται, ἢ γιγνώσκετου. [4] (Omnibus igitur principiis commune est, esse primum, unde aut est, aut fit, aut cognoscitur.) In the following chapter he distinguishes several kinds of causes, although somewhat superficially and confusedly. In the "Analyt. post." ii. 11, he states four kinds of causes in a more satisfactory manner : αίτίαι δὲ τέσσαρες μία μἐν τό τι ῆν είναι μία δὲ τὸ τινῶν ὀντων, ἀνάγκη τούτο είναι ἑτέρα δὲ, ἤ τι πρῶτον ἐκίνησε τετάρτη δὲ, τὸ τίνος ἒνεκα. [5] (Causæ
- ↑ " This especially would seem to be the first principle : that nothing arises without cause, but [everything] according to preceding causes." [Tr.'s add.]
- ↑ "We think we understand a thing perfectly, whenever we think we know the cause by which the thing is, that it is really the cause of that thing, and that the thing cannot possibly be Otherwise." [Tr.'s add.]
- ↑ Lib. iv. c. 1.
- ↑ "Now it is common to all principles, that they are the first thing through which [anything] is, or arises, or is understood." [Tr.'s add.]
- ↑ "There are four causes : first, the essence of a thing itself; second, the sine qua non of a thing; third, what first put a thing in motion; fourth, to what purpose or end a thing is tending." [Tr.'s add.]
