pie furnished only passive material for states- manship to work upon, and it saw in the public only potentialities for vague and general influ- ences which statesmanship in turn was to mold and utilize. The greatest distance it went, was to admit that national policy must rest on popu- lar instinct; a principle which is quite compatible with the practice of secret diplomacy. When we come to talk of political instincts, however, we are dealing with one of the vaguest and most in- definite concepts known to thought. These in- stincts may be interpreted and given active ex- pression as it suits any diplomatic policy. Un- fortunately the " instincts" most to the fore are not usually helpful to calm and sound action. In international affairs, an instinctive dislike or hatred of anything different has again and again been made the basis of aggressive action, stirring up otherwise peaceful populations to warlike and murderous intent. Great national policies may often truly be said to rest on instinct in the sense that undivided popular support is given to a pol- icy from a variety of motives which are not clearly reasoned out but which all express themselves in an overpowering impulse which may be called in- stinctive. Thus the Monroe policy in which the most fundamental motive is the desire for peace
