controlling question of law but does not identify what that question is. See McFarlin, 381 F.3d at 1264 (“If the district court is unsure about which of the questions, if any, that are answered by its order qualify for certification under § 1292(b), it should not certify the order for review. If convinced that a particular question does qualify, the district court should tell us which question it is.”). And, most problematic in our view, the parties intended to present more evidence on the issues addressed in the district court’s order, and the district court scheduled briefs and a hearing to allow it. We cannot use Section 1292(b) to “offer advisory opinions rendered on hypotheses which evaporate in the light of full factual development.” Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 605 F.2d 403, 406 (8th Cir. 1979) (cleaned up).
Second, we are not convinced the primary question the plaintiffs suggest we answer—whether county-level election officials are the proper defendants to redress the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries—is a “pure or abstract legal question” that can be “stated at a high enough level of abstraction to lift the question out of the details of the evidence or facts of a particular case.” McFarlin, 381 F.3d at 1259, 1262. This issue goes to the redressability element of standing. “Standing for Article III purposes requires a plaintiff to provide evidence of an injury in fact, causation and redressability.” Dermer v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 599 F.3d 1217, 1220 (11th Cir. 2010). A court must assess standing by making “a legal determination based on the facts established by the record.” Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc. v. City of
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