can rule on a pure, controlling question of law without having to delve beyond the surface of the record in order to determine the facts” and should not, in contrast, turn on case-specific inquiries, such as “whether the district court properly applied settled law to the facts or evidence of a particular case.” McFarlin v. Conseco Servs., LLC, 381 F.3d 1251, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004). This Court has identified five conditions necessary for it to consider an issue in an interlocutory appeal under Section 1292(b): “(1) the issue is a pure question of law, (2) the issue is controlling of at least a substantial part of the case, (3) the issue was specified by the district court in its order, (4) there are substantial grounds for difference of opinion on the issue, and (5) resolution may well substantially reduce the amount of litigation necessary on remand.” Mamani v. Berzain, 825 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted).
This avenue of appellate jurisdiction is also closed. The case does not meet our criteria for Section 1292(b) interlocutory review for at least three reasons.
First, Section 1292(b) does not countenance an interlocutory appeal at this point in the case. The district court’s Sunday night order was entered after only a weekend’s worth of litigation and does not conclusively answer any legal questions. Cf. Ray v. American Nat. Red Cross, 921 F.2d 324, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (no appeal when the district court certified the question under § 1292(b) without first deciding it). Perhaps for that reason, the order certifies that the case involves a
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