Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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Laos are limited by tonnage capacity, of road routes and air heads. The eight division capability is based on a 120 short ton per day divisional requirement (12,500 men per division). This represents the maximum capability during the dry season. During the rainy season the Communist capability would be reduced to introducing approximately five light regimental units. Communist logistic air support would be limited by airfield capacities.
b. The question of open counterintervention by Communist Bloc forces is in large part dependent upon the manner and the circumstances under which SEATO forces are introduced in Laos. The communists might well react simply with a political and diplomatic campaign to force withdrawal of SEATO forces. If counterintervention did occur, the Communists would be unlikely, at least initially, to seek direct engagement of SEATO forces with regular North Vietnamese of Chinese Communist forces, although there probably would be guerrilla harassment using "volunteers" or unacknowledged forces to supplement the insurgents now in Laos.
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