Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part IV. A. 5.djvu/276

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011


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were continued, and French strength and military resources were not substantially increased above those then programmed, "the Viet Minh probably can drive the French out of North Vietnam (Tonkin) within 6 to 9 months."

But half a year later, an NIE of 7 August 1951 (NIE-35, pp. 1-2), reported, "The present military situation in Indochina is one of stalemate." General de Lattre de Tassigny had repulsed the Viet Minh regime's drive to conquer Tonkin, this "success" resulting from a number of factors including French reinforcements, Viet Minh mistakes in their initial foray into large-scale conventional warfare, and "the timely arrival of U.S. military aid, including aircraft, napalm bombs, patrol and landing craft, and ground combat materiel, "which had helped de Lattre "to inflict heavy losses on the Viet Minh…" But, the Estimate noted, "Political developments … have been less favorable…"

In other words, the French and Bao Dai showed no intention of using the time thus purchased by averting military defeat to bring about political progress:[1]

" … Despite the gradual French transfer of certain responsibilities, the Vietnamese government has been slow to develop and has continued to suffer from a lack of strong leadership. It has had to contend with: (a) French reluctance to relinquish ultimate control of political and economic affairs; (b) lingering Vietnamese suspicion of any French-supported regime, combined with the apathetic and fence-sitting attitude of the bulk of the people, which has derived the government of broad-based popular support; (c) the difficulty common to all new and inexperienced governments, of training the necessary personnel and building an efficient administration; and (d) the failure of factional and sectional groups to unite in a concerted national effort.

"In January 1951 the opportunity arose of forming a broad-based cabinet representing most non-Communist group in Vietnam; instead Premier Huu formed a cabinet composed primarily of members of his own pro-French faction. Although Huu has displayed some administrative skill and his government has gained slowly in effectiveness, the weakness of the Huu cabinet and its alleged 'French puppet' status have limited its appeal to Vietnamese nationalism and have alienated strong nationalist groups, including the powerful Dai Viet group in Tonkin. Communist control of much of the country and Viet Minh infiltration of large areas under nominal French control have also discouraged many people from openly allying themselves with the government."

  1. In this and all following citations) italics are added, unless otherwise noted.
2
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