Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
There had been more progress in efforts to create a national Vietnamese army, "an essential prerequisite to growth in the political stature of the Vietnamese government and to ultimate· non-cormnunist solution in Indochina," but "progress in the formation of the Army is retarded by lack of capable officers at all levels of command, shortages of equipment, and the apathetic attitude of the populace." (Weaknesses in officers -- in large part the policy of officer recruitment and promotion -- have fatally weakened Vietnamese army operations ever Since.) In the end) the French neither built a genuinely Vietnamese army, nor allowed the native armed force any role or status which might have made it an effective adjunct of nationalism.
On the communist side, the estimate noted that:
"The communist party role has been strengthened) with strict party liners coming more into the foreground … in the absence of further military victories) Viet Minh popular support appears unlikely to increase … while we are unable to determine whether the Viet Minh is actually losing any of its popular appeal) the regime apparently is dependent more and more on tightened communist controls … these tightened controls may prevent defections and facilitate the exploitation of people already under Viet Minh control."
Two years later) NIE-91 of 4 June 1953 continued to emphasize the critical problems. of lack of support for the Bao Dai regime and lack of Indochines e will and ability to resist the Viet Minh. Some political progress could be pointed to during the preceding year) including local elections in secure areas) and decisions in March 1953 to increase the size of the Vietnamese National Army; and, a note that reads familiarly nearly fifteen years later:
"Another Vietnamese program) undertaken with U. S. economic assistance, which involves the relocation of scattered villages in the [Tonkin]. delta into centralized and defensible sites may be an important step toward the eventual 'pacification' of heavily infiltrated areas."
However,
"Despite these advances) Vietnam still lacks the degree of political strength essential for the mobilization of the country's resources. Tam's 'action' program remains more shadow than substance. Elected local councils have no real power, promised land reform and other social and economic reforms which might generate popular support have not left
