Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
Regional Director, Far East, ISA, from Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, OSO/OSD, 13 September 1960, Subject: Possible Course of Action in Vietnam, p. 1) (Underlining added)
To the end of meeting the threat from the Viet Cong, Lansdale suggested (among other items):
" … The emphasis of the MAAG function should be shifted from purely training and organizational advice in preparation for defense against external aggression to include on-the-spot advice and assistance in the conduct of tactical operations against the Viet Cong." (Underlining added)
" … Concomitantly, the MAAG should be staffed to a greater extent with officers skilled in the conduct of counter-guerrilla operations and who are capable of operating in the field. This might include Marines for amphibious instruction on Mekong River operations …"
" … During the emergency, the Civil Guard should be temporarily put under the Ministry of Defense in order to integrate the activities of the ARVN and the Civil Guard. The Ambassador's concern that the Civil Guard will lose all identity as a civil police force, if this action is taken, is invalid, providing a strong US position to the contrary is announced and maintained." (Ibid., pp. 1-2)
(Subsequent development of the Regional Forces, which grew out of the Civil Guard after transfer to the Ministry of Defense in December 1960, showed this particular concern of the Ambassador to have been a valid one -- whatever the countervailing advantages of the move -- in that its role and capabilities as a police force atrophied almost entirely; no "strong U.S. position to the contrary" was, however, taken by MAAG, AID, or CAS.)
" … Emphasis on civic action type activities by the ARVN should be encouraged and advisory and material assistance in this field furnished through MAP and ICA channels."
" … Most importantly for the purpose of strengthening the morale of the Vietnamese, President Diem should be informed as soon as possible through appropriate channels of the gravity with which the US government views the internal security situation, of our intent to provide material assistance, and of our unswerving support to him in this time of crisis." (Underlining added) (Ibid., p. 2)
Meanwhile, Ambassador Durbrow in Saigon proceeded to elaborate upon the various political threats described in the August 30 SNIE. A week after the August 1960 SNIE was published, Ambassador Durbrow
