Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
found it appropriate to send an assessment of the potentialities of various groups for coups and demonstrations in the short run. Among these were:
"1. Peasants. Various factors discontent exist such as lack of adequate protection against communist attacks and pressures, low prices paddy, compulsory labor on agrovilles and other projects, and arbitrary methods of authorities. Diem has taken some steps to try alleviate sources of discontent (our G-79) but it is important he take others because peasantry represent key to success or failure communist guerrilla warfare in countryside and thus to gradual undermining of regime. However, any sudden demonstration or coup against GVN likely to center in Saigon and seems improbable that peasantry in view lack organization, transport problems, etc. would play significant role therein." (Saigon 538 to SecState, 5 September 1960, p. 1, Section 1 of 2)
(It is worth noting that this list of peasant grievances against the regime, like most such analyses by CIA or State, includes a number of separate factors, of which "lack of protection against communist attacks and pressures" is only one. This assessment of peasant attitudes toward the GVN was in some contrast to: (a) other analyses, particularly originating in the Department of Defense, but also from Diem himself, emphasizing lack of security as the single significant peasant grievance, or the overwhelmingly predominant one, or the basis of the others; and (b) effective U.S . advice and influence, which increaSingly centered upon the security problem.)
Urban groups, including labor and students (who were just beginning to show political ferment) were judged unlikely to begin a demonstration but increasingly likely to join one begun by other oppositionists either within or outside the government. Dissatisfaction with the regime existed even among Catholic refugees, some of this stemming "paradoxically … from what they feel is too heavily Catholic leadership of regime (with potential reaction to follow) … " (This worry appeared less paradoxical in the summer of 1963.)
As for the Army:
" … Some discontent exists because of political promotions and favoritism throughout armed forces structure. Some disturbing indications of possible development spirit frustration and defeatism in fight against Viet Cong also received, such as statement allegedly made by General Duong Van Minh that for every Viet Cong killed by armed forces government creating ten in their rear; however indications are that generals remain imbued by non-political approach and that discontent is not of such
