Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
opportunities to urge Diem and others to adopt at least the most important suggestions of his demarche of October 14; moreover, the Ambassador now emphasized the necessity for leverage, as well as persuasion, in inducing him both to institute political reforms and to accept the basic principles of the MAAG Counter-Insurgency Plan:
"Since it far from certain Diem will introduce sufficiently appealing and effective new programs and use his present security forces in most efficacious manner, we must find suitable means to bring pressure on him. As I outlined in Embtel 1105 as well as in memorandum this subject (letter to Parsons Nov 8,) I am convinced, even if we eventually should agree, that we should not now accord his request for 20,000 additional force or concur in his unilateral action to raise force level (Chief MAAG 1537 Dec 1 - copy JCS). To do so without his having relaxed controls, instituted effective reforms and having permitted efficient use present forces, would not save the day for Diem but might even induce him follow his instinct to rely primarily on use of force both to control population and fight VC. While I am not fully convinced need for extra 20,000 men, I would be willing to concur in such addition if careful study by all concerned concurred in this recommendation. (MAAG views on urgent need for 20,000 increase forwarded Parsons my letter Nov 30th) therefore, suggested this matter be carefully studied Washington and if final recommendation is favorable it be kept secret as ace in the hole to grant Diem provided he has taken other necessary steps which are to me much more fundamental, and provided he needs extra force after taking more essential steps. If, for instance, at the beginning next year he has taken effective steps along lines suggested above and it is still considered he needs increased force level we could so inform him then. But in meantime, in view his threat to raise force level unilaterally, I should be instructed soonest to taut suitable opportunity to state while force level increase is under consideration Washington cannot now see its way clear to grant such increase when other more important steps are essential at pres e nt in fight against VC and to make further progress Viet-Nam.
"In summary, situation in Viet-Nam is highly dangerous to US interests. Communists are engaged in large-scale guerrilla effort to take over countryside and oust Diem's Government. Their activities have steadily increased. in intensity throughout this year. In addition Diem is faced with widespread popular dissatisfaction with his government's inability to stem the communist tide and its own heavy-handed methods of operation. It seems clear that if he is to remain in power he must meet
