Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
these two challenges by improvements in his methods of conducting war against communists and in vigorous action to build greater popular support. We should help and encourage him to take effective action. Should he not do so, we may well be forced) in not too distant future, to undertake difficult task of identifying and supporting alternate leadership." (Saigon 1151 to SecState, 4 December 1960, Section 2 of 2, pp.2-3)
At the same time that Durbrow turned to an emphasis on pressure, his dispatch contained strong hints that U.S. ability to influence Diem and his immediate entourage without pressure might have declined, as an immediate result of the abortive coup and the perceived relation of the U.S. to it.
"Nhu and Diem still deeply rankled particularly by critical American press stories about autocratic regime and entourage, and Diem made the ridiculous statement to Ladejinsky November 30th that he believes some Americans may have backed coup because one of coup leaders, Colonel Dong, 'told him so during negotiations.' This may represent rationalization blame others not selves … " both Nhu and Diem now expressing deep displeasure because Americans equated Diem regime with rebels because both anti-Communists and therefore we urged both sides negotiate. While under circumstances their attitude understandable, we have made point clear to them that we did all in our power to prevent that he should be given active role in any government established … " (Ibid., Section 1 of 2, p. 2)
At best, a state of affairs in which Diem believed we had been sympathetic to a rebellion against him could only be ominous for our relationship with him, and Durbrow implicitly acknowledged this in recommending a conciliatory gesture of reassurance, of a type that was to characterize our relations with the Diem regime in subsequent years:
"Since Diem believes we do not understand seriousness of VC threat and he suspects we may have encouraged rebels, we should make arrangements immediately to ship six H-34 helicopters which are not only most urgently needed fight VC effectively but would reassure Diem we trying give effective help." (Ibid., Section 2 of 2, p. 2)
In the eyes of those who regarded Diem as the indispensable kingpin of effective anti-communist policy in Vietnam, and thus a mutual feeling of confidence and trust between Diem and the U.S. of paramount importance, such a gesture seemed pitifully inadequate -- and, indeed, Durbrow's continuing presence as Ambassador possibly counter-productive -- in the situation prevailing after the attempted coup. For example, another Lansdale memorandum:
