Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET – Sensitive
| 98. | "Direct Aid to the Associated States...," in ibid., 88–89. |
| 99. | "Aid to the State of Vietnam...," in ibid., 89–90. |
| 100. | Quoted in Nighswonger, op. cit., 42, from New York Times for February 13, 1955, p. 1. General Collins, the President's emissary to the GVN, was reported at the same time to be pressing for a "more reliable armed force chiefly designed to maintain internal security," with protection from external aggression supplied by SEATO. Ibid., quoting Baltimore Sun for 1 February 1955, p. 1. |
| 101. | NSC 5612/1, "U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia," (September 5, 1956), 11, provides that the U.S. will: "assist Free Viet Nam to build up indigenous armed forces, including independent logistical and administrative services, which will be capable of assuring internal security and of providing limited initial resistance to attack by the Viet Minh." "United initial resistance" was defined by JCS memo for SecDef, dated 21 December 1956, subject as above, as follows: "resistance to Communist aggression by defending or by delaying in such manner as to preserve and maintain the integrity of the government and its armed forces for the period of time required to invoke the UN Charter and/or the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty or the period of time required for the U.S. Government to determine that considerations of national security require unilateral assistance and to commit U.S. or collective security forces to support or reinforce indigenous forces in defense of the country attacked." |
| 102. | "Vietnam's Defense Capacity," in The American Stake in Vietnam, op. cit., 86. |
| 103. | Scigliano, op. cit., 163; Judson J. Conner, "Teeth for the Free World Dragon," Army Information Digest (November, 1960), 43. |
| 104. | U.S., Joint Chiefs of Staff, telegram JCS 974802 of 30 March 1960 to CINCPAC noted increasingly deteriorating internal security in Vietnam and informed that:
"The JCS agree that anti-guerrilla capability should be developed within organization of the regular armed forces by changing emphasis in training selected elements ARVN and other forces from conventional to anti-guerrilla warfare." This cable among many of that period refocused the MAAG Mission on internal security, and this became the central theme of the military portions of the "Counter-insurgency Plan for South Viet-Nam" of January, 1961. U.S. Embassy, Saigon, Despatch No. 276, of January 4, 1961. The MAAG "Country Statements" for the period 1956-1960 record a concentration on developing the staff and logistic superstructure of ARVN, and on |
