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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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problem to suggest." George C. Marshall, Secretary of State, 431 to Paris, 3 February 1947 |
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| 69. | The U.S. is concerned that the Western democratic system is on the defensive in emerging nations and Southern Asia is in a critical phase. The key to the U.S. position is an awareness that in respect to the position of Western democratic powers in Southern Asia, the United States is in the boat as the French, British and the Dutch. "We cannot conceive setbacks to the long range interests of France which would not also be setbacks of our own." The U.S. is ready to he helpful in any way, however, non-intervention is still the U.S. policy. Marshall 1737 to Paris, 13 May 1947 | 100 |
| 70. | The State Department is concerned that a rumored, dry season French offensive would have repercussions in a Congress which will be called on for extensive financial aid to Western Europe in light of France's economic, financial, and food position. Marshall 3433 to Paris, 11 September 1947 | 103 |
| 71. | M. Bollaert, French High Commissioner in Indochina, delivers publicly the most important declaration of French policy since before hostilities broke out. The French ask for a Vietnamese "representative government" to accept French terms, and exclude dealing with Ho Chi Minh except as a last resort, and then only for his surrender. The U.S. sees this policy resulting from a strengthened France (and a proportional unwillingness to make concessions) as a "retreat" from the March 6 accords. O'Sullivan letter to Marsha, 12 September 1947 | 104 |
| 72. | The French deny any planned dry season military offensive. Caffery 3715, 12 September 1947 | 111 |
| 73. | France considers Bollaert's policy speech as a step forward on two points: formal abandonment of Indochina federation idea, and acceptance of the principle of union of the three KYs without a referenda. Caffery 3753 to Marshall, 14 September 1947 | 112 |
| 74. | The Chinese view French policy as making the position of U.S. and China difficult and do not see a successful government without participation of Ho Chi Minh. The "Chinese people" would not regarded a Bao Dai monarchy favorably. Though his | |
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