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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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| 135. | The State Department announces the results of high level conversations with French Ministers and that the U. S. Congress has appropriated one-half billion dollars in military assistance for the Far East* Department of State press release 1066, 17 October 1950 | 371 |
| 136. | State and Defense recapitulate talks with the French Ministers, analyze Saigon's views on Indochina, and review the proposed NSC policy statement on Indochina: The French had not programmed equipment for 18 battalions in the 1951 budget and further had requested that the U.S. pay for and maintain the national armies when formed. It appears that the French will withdraw from Tonkin and may throw the problem to the U.N. The draft policy statement is considered quite adequate. Memorandum for the Record (Mr. K.T. Young), 17 October 1950 | 373 |
| 137. | The current situation in Indochina reveals serious weakness in French manpower, leadership, and intelligence. The Viet Minh forces are building up for large-scale offensives to seize complete control of Indochina. The French Union forces of 353,970 are opposed by 92,500 Viet Minh regulars and 130,000 irregulars. U.S. Naval Intelligence Memorandum, 17 October 1950 | 382 |
| 138. | The U.S. informs Emperor Bao Dai, with emphasis, that it is imperative that he give the Vietnamese people evidence of his determination to personally lead his country into immediate and "energetic opposition" to the communist menace. The U.S. has interpreted his "prolonged holiday" on the Riviera as lack of patriotism. It is tactfully suggested that further displays of procrastination might lead to loss of U.S. support for his government. Acheson 384 to Saigon, 18 October 1950 | 388 |
| 139. | A Defense view is that it is "most important that the French do not quit cold and leave a political vacuum behind them." The U.S. should give increased military aid but not intervene and stress political steps by the French. Memorandum for Secretary Finletter, 19 October 1950 | 391 |
| 140. | U.S. desires the immediate political and military advantages sought in the National army plan be found through integration of armed native contingents (Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Catholics, etc.) into an army commanded by Bao Dai. Acheson 436 to Saigon, 25 October 1950 | 393 |
| 141. | U.S. approves French request to transfer 24 – 105 mm howitzers and 6 – 155 mm howitzers of MDAP assistance to Indochina. Acheson 2250 to Paris, 27 October 1950 | 394 |
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