Index:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 2. b.djvu

Title	United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense, Part V. B. 2. b.
Author	The Pentagon
Year	2011
Publisher	U.S. Government
Location	Washington, D.C.
Source	djvu
Progress	To be proofread
Transclusion	Index not transcluded or unreviewed
Volumes	Index Part I Part II Part III Part IV: A. 1 A. 2 A. 3 A. 4 A. 5 B. 1 B. 2 B. 3 B. 4 B. 5 C. 1 C. 2a C. 2b C. 2c C. 3 C. 4 C. 5 C. 6.a C. 6.b C. 6.c C. 7.a C. 7.b C. 8 C. 9.a C. 9.b C. 10 Part V: A. Vol. I. A A. Vol. I. B A. Vol. I. C A. Vol. II. D B. 1 B. 2.a B. 2.b B. 3.a B. 3.b B. 3.c B. 3.d B. 4 Book I B. 4 Book II Part VI: A B C-1 C-2 C-3 C-4

Pages (key to Page Status)

V. B. 2. b. 1950–1952

Cover Front Title

a

Contents i ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix x xi xii xiii xiv xv xvi xvii xviii xix xx xxi xxii xxiii xxiv xxv xxvi

V. B. 2. b. 1950

1950 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416

V. B. 2. b. 1951

1951 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464

V. B. 2. b. 1952

1952 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540

V.B.2

JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR -- INTERNAL COMMITMENTS

The Truman Administration, 1945 – 1952

Contents and

Chronological List of Documents

	1945	Page
1.	Extract of minutes of State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) held 13 April: Mr. Lovett states that "the lack of a policy [on Indochina] is a source of serious embarrassment to the military." The Committee agreed that the State Department should take up the question of clarification of policy on Indochina. Memorandum, R. E. Cox, SWNCC, to Mr. Bonbright - Minutes, 23 May (13 April) 1945	1
2.	Secretary of State Stettinius informs Ambassador Caffery (France) on the status of U.S. assistance to French resistance groups in Indochina, Stettinius 1576 to Caffery (Paris), 19 April 1945	3
3.	The U.S. rejects a French proposal to conclude an agreement with the French Provisional Government analogous to the Franco-Allied agreement of 25 August 1944. The U.S. refuses to consider diversion of resources to specific military operations in Indochina. Stettinius letter to French Ambassador Bonnet, 20 April 1945	5
4.	The State Department undertakes an internal task to clarify U.S. policy toward Indochina following President Roosevelt's death, 12 April 1945, and the SWNCC meeting, 13 April 1945. A summary of how the State Department documented this task and the pertinent documents follow as 4.a. through 4.e.	9
	a. Division of European Affairs (EUR) submits a proposed "Memorandum on Indochina Policy" to the Assistant Secretary for forwarding to the President. The memorandum recommends that the U.S. not oppose restoration of Indochina to France. H. Freeman Matthews, EUR, Memorandum, to Mr. Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State, 20 April 1945	9
101.	The U.S. regards establishment of Bao Dai as only the "first step" in the evolution of the Vietnam problem and that France will have to concede more to accommodate nationalists. Webb (Acting) 145 to Rangoon, 20 June 1949	219
102.	The Singapore Conference recommends that the U.S. join the UK in support of Bao Dai, that the French clarify Vietnam's legal status, that de facto recognition be granted on 1 January 1950, and hopes that the U.S. would fulfill its UN duties in event of an attack on Indochina. Bliss (London) A2063 to SecState, 9 November 1949	223
103.	The National Security Council submits a report, "The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia," which, from a military view, indicates the "current basic concept of strategic offense in the 'West' and a strategic defense in the 'East.' The importance of Southeast Asia is principally as an exporter of strategic materials -- tin, fibers, and rubber." NSC 48/1, 23 December 1949	225
104.	The President approves the conclusions of NSC 48/1 as amended. The basic objectives cited are -- development of stable nations and sufficient military power to prevent communist expansion in Asia, reduction of USSR influence in Asia, and prevention of power relationships which could threaten the U.S. Specifically, in Indochina, the U.S. will use its influence to resolve the colonialist-nationalist. conflict. NSC 48/2, 30 December 1949	265
1950
105.	The JCS reviews the current Mutual Defense Assistance Program and certain objectives evolve as the basis for future military assistance programs. A specific long range objective is "development of sufficient military power in selected nations of the Far East" to prevent encroachment by communism. JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 26 January 1950	273
106.	The State Department recommends and President Truman approves recognition of the three legally constituted governments of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Memorandum for the President, 2 February 1950	276
107.	The U.S. forwards the letters of recognition to the Associated States and requests a reply to the suggestion on exchange of diplomatic representatives. Acheson 59 to Saigon, 4 February 1950	278
108.	Asiatic neighbors consider Bao Dai a French puppet. The U.S. should realize that ECA and military aid from the U.S. do not constitute decisive factors in Indochina's problems. Therefore the Griffin Mission should not commit ECA or military aid to French Indochina unless France "gives requisite public undertakings re further steps leading to status similar to Indonesia." Stanton (Bangkok) 160 to Acheson, 17 February 1950	280
109.	The State Department submits to the NSC a report on "The Position of the United States with Respect to Indochina," which analyzes the problem to determine measures to protect U.S. security in Indochina and prevent communist expansion in the area. NSC No. 64, 27 February 1950	282
110.	President Truman approves the designation of Mr. Robert A. Griffin as Chief of the Economic Survey Mission to Southeast Asia, with rank of Minister. Five basic objectives of the Mission are outlined; (1) determine needed projects of political significance; (2) prepare for Point 4 programs; (3) advise local officials of methods and extent of participation in Point 4; (4) brief U.S. representatives; and (5) investigate regional aspects of technical assistance. Department of State letter to Griffin, 1 March 1950	286
111.	The State Department maintains to the Department of Defense that Indochina is subject to immediate danger and is the "most strategically important area of Southeast Asia." Dean Rusk believes that the resources of the U. S. should be deployed to "reserve Indochina from further Communist encroachment." Dean Rusk, Deputy Undersecretary of State to General James H. Burns, Defense Representative to Southeast Asia Aid Committee, 7 March 1950	288
112.	Acheson instructs Saigon, in light of anticipated Franco-Viet friction on handling U.S. aid, that function of Griffin Mission is "clearly understood to be fact finding." Acheson 136 to Saigon, 9 March 1950	289
113.	Griffin replies that "I understand that ours is an economic aid mission" and that the budding controversy could jeopardize the economic aid program. The French show no enthusiasm for Point 4. Gullion (Saigon) 176 to Acheson, 13 March 1950	290
114.	Griffin submits his mission's preliminary conclusions on Indochina with a listing of specific urgent programs totaling $23.5 million exclusive of military aid and indirect
	U.S. aid (e.g., through France). Obstacles should not permit indecision to allocate aid money or materials; the "crux of the situation lies in prompt decisive action if desired political effect is to he attained." Griffin file copy of telegram sent to Acheson, 16 March 1950	292
115.	The U.S. assumes that France is determined to protect Indochina from communist encroachment, that success depends on indigenous support, and that France supports Bao Dai, but that the French position and ultimate intentions are not clear to the rest of the world. The U.S. requests France to make a public statement of the concessions to Indochinese nationalism. Acheson 1363 to Paris, 29 March 1950	301
116.	Acheson advises Griffin Mission of the implications for U.S. policy in Vietnam: (1) The prospect of U.S. aid indirectly would cause crisis (induce hyper-confidence in Viets); (2) Viets bitter at Huu appointment (and the U.S.) may magnify the U.S. role; (3) it is better for the U.S. if a national union government is set up; and (4) the aid program can more easily be worked out with Huu Government. Acheson 244 to Griffin, 9 April 1950	305
117.	Department of State requests an assessment of the strategic aspects of Indochina from a military point of view because of the threat of communist domination. The Joint Chiefs of Staff indicate that the "mainland states of Southeast Asia also are at present of critical strategic importance to the United States," because of the requirement to stockpile strategic materials acquired there, as well as the threat to other states on the "line of containment." JCS Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 10 April 1950	308
118.	The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur with the State Department on the importance of Southeast Asia to the U.S. However, the JCS urge a more forceful and positive U.S. position than expressed by State -- ".…in order to retrieve the losses resulting from previous mistakes on the part of the British and French, as well as to preclude such mistakes in the future, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it necessary that positive and proper leadership among the Western Powers be assumed by the United States in Southeast Asia matters." JCS Memorandum for SecDef, 2 May 1950	315
119.	The JCS recommend telling the French that the U.S. is prepared to assist France and the three Associated States and that arrangements for U.S. military aid be made. JCS Memorandum for SecDef, 2 May 1950	318
120.	President Truman approves $10 million for military items to Indochina, Acheson 2049 to London, 3 May 1950	321
121.	Griffin reconstructs the Indochina situation for Secretary Acheson. Griffin indicates that the present status quo cannot be maintained. "Time is of the essence…." if Bao Dai starts to slip, "it will he impossible to restore him." Given that the French are aware that a military solution is unattainable,"the U.S. must find out what the French expect of Vietnam." Griffin Memorandum to Secretary of State, 4 May 1950	322
122.	The special survey mission headed by R. Allen Griffin recommends a modest $60 million economic and technical assistance program for Southeast Asia. State press release 485, 11 May 1950	327
123	The Ministers of the U.S., U.K., and France agree that while Southeast Asia is of strategic importance to the U.S., the direct responsibilities of U.K. and France make it of greater concern to them. Extract of Tripartite Ministerial Talks, 13 May 1950	328
124.	The French affirm responsibility for Indochina, acknowledge "supplementary" U.S. assistance, and assure that 8 March agreements would be "liberally implemented." London - SECTO 256, 14 May 1950	330
125.	U.S. formally announces intent to establish an economic aid mission to the three Associated States of Indochina. State press release 545, 25 May 1950	332
126.	On the basis of the Griffin recommendations, the U.S publicly announces the launching of a program of rapid economic aid to Southeast Asia. Secretary of State Dean Acheson letter to R. Allen Griffin, 3 June 1950	335
127.	North Korea attacks South Korea and President Truman announces U.S. military assistance not only to South Korea but also an "acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States in Indochina and the dispatch of a military mission.…" Presidential Statement, 27 June 1950	336
128.	The U.S. clarifies the principles governing U.S. military aid to Indochina. Essentially, the basic principles are: U.S. aid supplements French assistance to Associated States
	to achieve internal security; assist army of the French Union against communist aggression; Korean events could cause diversion of aid from Associated States. Acheson 4 to Saigon, 1 July 1950	338
129.	A summary of existing policy on Indochina reveals the JCS view on NSC 73 that the U.S. give consideration to providing air and naval assistance should the Chinese provide overt support to the Viet Minh. Consultants' Meeting, 25 July 1950	341
130.	The U.S. feels that French requests for overall assistance (military , economic, and political) are inadequate to "consummate U.S. broad objectives in Indochina" and assistance will have to be increased to resist encroachment of communism. Heath (Saigon) 170 to Acheson, 7 August 1950	343
131.	The U.S. views growing political and military deterioration in Indochina with concern; especially evident are failure of the government to gain support, disinclination of Bao Dai to assume leadership role, and indications of CHICOM-Viet Minh military collaboration. The U.S. seeks to have Vietnam establish a national army and declare a national emergency. Acheson 238 to Saigon, 1 September 1950	344
132.	The U.S. informs France that the U.S. was prepared to increase assistance to French Union forces but could not furnish money for local use or direct tactical air support. Extract of Summary Minutes of Tripartite, Foreign Ministers Meeting, France, U.K., and U.S., 14 September 1950	347
133.	The Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee (SEAC) proposes a statement of U.S. policy on Indochina to the NSC for consideration. "The U.S. will not commit any of its armed forces to the defense of Indochina against overt, foreign aggression.…" but should assist in the "formation of new national armies of the three Associated States." The U.S. should also "press the French" to carry out the agreements of 8 March 1949 and 30 December 1949. SEAC D–21, 11 October 1950	349
134.	"The draft statement of U.S. policy in Indochina is weak from the political side.…the Defense representatives argued for a strong, hardhitting policy on political and economic concessions. The State Department representatives flatly refused.…to consider Indochina in that manner. Consequently, the paper ended with a compromise." K. T. Young, DoD Office of Foreign Military Affairs, letter to General Malony, SEAC, 13 October 1950	369
135.	The State Department announces the results of high level conversations with French Ministers and that the U. S. Congress has appropriated one-half billion dollars in military assistance for the Far East* Department of State press release 1066, 17 October 1950	371
136.	State and Defense recapitulate talks with the French Ministers, analyze Saigon's views on Indochina, and review the proposed NSC policy statement on Indochina: The French had not programmed equipment for 18 battalions in the 1951 budget and further had requested that the U.S. pay for and maintain the national armies when formed. It appears that the French will withdraw from Tonkin and may throw the problem to the U.N. The draft policy statement is considered quite adequate. Memorandum for the Record (Mr. K.T. Young), 17 October 1950	373
137.	The current situation in Indochina reveals serious weakness in French manpower, leadership, and intelligence. The Viet Minh forces are building up for large-scale offensives to seize complete control of Indochina. The French Union forces of 353,970 are opposed by 92,500 Viet Minh regulars and 130,000 irregulars. U.S. Naval Intelligence Memorandum, 17 October 1950	382
138.	The U.S. informs Emperor Bao Dai, with emphasis, that it is imperative that he give the Vietnamese people evidence of his determination to personally lead his country into immediate and "energetic opposition" to the communist menace. The U.S. has interpreted his "prolonged holiday" on the Riviera as lack of patriotism. It is tactfully suggested that further displays of procrastination might lead to loss of U.S. support for his government. Acheson 384 to Saigon, 18 October 1950	388
139.	A Defense view is that it is "most important that the French do not quit cold and leave a political vacuum behind them." The U.S. should give increased military aid but not intervene and stress political steps by the French. Memorandum for Secretary Finletter, 19 October 1950	391
140.	U.S. desires the immediate political and military advantages sought in the National army plan be found through integration of armed native contingents (Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Catholics, etc.) into an army commanded by Bao Dai. Acheson 436 to Saigon, 25 October 1950	393
141.	U.S. approves French request to transfer 24 – 105 mm howitzers and 6 – 155 mm howitzers of MDAP assistance to Indochina. Acheson 2250 to Paris, 27 October 1950	394
142.	General Brink, Chief MAAG-Indochina, reports that the French contemplate changing troops from "pacification" dispositions to larger unit regroupment. French military plans are keyed to delays in political decisions. Saigon 763 to Acheson, 4 November 1950 (see Enclosure A to Document No. 146, below)	405
143.	The U.S. does not favor use of the Peace Observation Commission in Indochina and if the Indochina subject is to come into the United Nations, it is preferred that the French do it. Acheson 516 to UN, 22 November 1950	395
144.	The U.S. publicly welcomes the French statement which assures independence of the Associated States of Indochina within the French Union and that their resources will be directed "to the defense of Indochina against communist colonialism." Department of State press release 1187, 27 November 1950	397
145.	"If the Communists are successful in Korea, this may so weaken the French in Indochina that they will pull out. He [Secretary Acheson] doubted if any one of the President's advisers would urge him to intervene in that situation." Extract from Truman-Attlee Conversations, 4 December 1950	398
146.	The Joint Chiefs of Staff position paper on possible future action in Indochina, 28 November 1950, is circulated for NSC consideration. This paper includes the Brink report (4 November 1950) as a reference. The JCS short term objectives emphasize urgent action to deny Indochina to communism, insure retention of responsibility by France, and development of an over-all military plan for Indochina. The long term objectives seek to prevent communist expansion, to establish internal security conditions such as the foreign armed forces would be removed, to press the French to carry out commitments, and to establish a regional security arrangement in Southeast Asia. Executive Secretary to the NSC, NSC 64/1, 21 December 1950	399
1951
147.	President Truman reasserts that U.S. aid to the French Union forces and National armies of the Associated States will continue. Truman-Pleven Conversations, 30 January 1951	417
148.	The U.S. is very unlikely to engage itself to finance the budgetary deficit of France (25 billion francs) required for the National armies in Indochina. Acheson 974 to Saigon, 30 January 1951	419
149.	The first progress report on NSC 64, which was approved on 27 March 1950, assesses the most severe threat to French Indochina as the increased capability of the Viet Minh resulting from Red Chinese aid. Optimistically, the report concludes that "American military aid furnished the State's forces and the Army of the French Union may have been the decisive factor in the preservation of the area against communist aggression." State Department Memorandum to NSC, 15 March 1951	421
150.	President Truman approves NSC Action 48/5 which states U.S. policy on Asia. With respect to Indochina, U.S. policy seeks to continue to increase French military effectiveness, to encourage internal autonomy, and to promote international support for the three Associated States. NSC 48/5, 17 May 1951	425
151.	Dulles discusses problems with Parodi of participation of the three Associated States as "sovereign" with respect to U.N. membership, Viet Minh rival government, and positions of India, Burma, and Indonesia. Dulles-Parodi Conversation, 11 June 1951	446
152.	The U.S. invites Vietnam, Cambodia, end Laos to participate in signing of Japanese Peace Treaty. Saigon 132 despatch to State, 6 September 1951	447
153.	The U.S. and Vietnam enter into an economic cooperation agreement. Agreement entered into force 7 September 1951	449
154.	The U.S. agrees with France that they will continue to be primarily responsible for Indochina, that U.S. troops should not be used, and that first priority in military aid should go to Indochina. U.S.-France Foreign Ministers Meeting, 11 September 1951	452
155.	President Truman and Secretary Acheson pledge support for General DeLattre and that "we would not let Indochina fall into enemy hands." Memorandum of Conversation, Acheson, Schuman, and DeLattre, 14 September 1951	454
156.	General DeLattre comments to the State Department that the aid program had not been working out satisfactorily due to the "missionary zeal" of certain "young men" which made it appear that the U.S. was extending its influence. State Department Discussions with DeLattre, 17 September 1951	456
157.	The U.S. recounts the doubts and distrust remaining on the subject of colonialism in Indochina but maintains that the real issue is whether or not the Indochinese people will be allowed to exercise sovereignty or be subjected to communist terror. Dean Rusk Address, 6 November 1951	459
158.	France requests that conversation take place immediately between U.S., U.K. and France concerning concerted action in the event of seemingly imminent Chinese intervention in Indochina. Bruce (Paris) 3765 to Acheson, 22 December 1951	460
159.	France delivers an aide-memoire to the U.S. on a proposal to appeal to the U.N. if Red China intervenes. Paris 3856 to Acheson, 29 December 1951	462
1952
160.	Acheson reviews tripartite military discussions in which State did not participate. General Bradley, while unable to commit or indicate the extent of U.S. military assistance in the event of CHICOM invasion, would recommend to the President that a declaration be issued to Red China that retaliation would follow any aggression. Acheson 974 to Saigon, 15 January 1952	465
161.	The NSC considers the consequences to the United States of communist domination of Southeast Asia. Loss of Southeast Asia is seen as putting economic and political pressures on Japan, opening sources of strategic materials to the Soviet Bloc, rendering the U.S. position in the Pacific precarious and jeopardizing lines of communication and trade routes to South Asia. If Red China intervenes, the U.S. should take appropriate military action as part of a U.N. action or in conjunction with others but not unilaterally. Annex to NSC 124, 13 February 1952	468
162.	The CIA estimates that a joint warning against CHICOM intervention in Southeast Asia would tend to deter them, that initiation of action in the U.N. would probably bring a response similar to that regarding Korea, and CHICOM defiance of a joint warning would probably involve prior consent of the USSR. CIA Special Estimate, SE-22, 29 February 1952	477
163.	The JCS views on NSC 124 and Annex to NSC 124 are that military operations in defense of Indochina against Chinese Communist invasion must be accompanied by action against Communist China itself -- a course of action which might result in a long and expensive war, and that from a military point of view, the JCS oppose acceptance of all the military commitments of NSC 124. JCS Memorandum for the SecDef (forwarded to the National Security Council), 3 March 1952	486
164.	The NSC recommends that the military implications of going to war in China be studied further and explained to the Council and the President; that the greater danger to Southeast Asia is subversion and not external aggression; and that contingencies for a French withdrawal be examined. NSC 113th Meeting (item 3), 5 March 1952	502
165.	The U.S. stresses to the British that rumors of French intentions to withdraw or negotiate with Ho Chi Minh are not true. The U.S. believes that France will stay in Indochina as long as sufficient U.S. aid is forthcoming. Acheson Conversation with British Ambassador, 28 March 1952	508
166.	French stress their problems at tripartite meeting concerning their EDC commitments: (1) the French effort in Indochina, (2) financial difficulties and whether the strategic importance of SEA justified continued effort, and (3) Indochina is part of the European defense problem. France cannot continue to bear "alone such great share Indochinese burden." French attach great importance to U.S. aid. Acheson 7415 to State, 28 May 1952	511
167.	If the Chinese invade Indochina, "he [Acheson] said it was clear that it was futile and a mistake to defend Indochina in Indochina. He said we could not have another Korea.… we could not put ground troops in Indochina.…our only hope was of changing the Chinese mind." Secretary of State Note (L.D. Battle), 17 June 1952	515
168.	U.S. informs France that appropriations would be prepared to provide up to 150 million dollars additional FY 1953 aid in support of overall French effort in Indochina. Acheson 7404 to Paris, 17 June 1952	517
169.	Acheson publicly announces optimism over the conduct of the National armies in Indochina and that communist "aggression has been checked" and that the "tide is now moving in our favor." State Department Release 473, 18 June 1952	518
170.	The President approves NSC 124/2 (NSC 124/1 as amended) on the U.S. objectives and courses of action with respect to Southeast Asia. With respect to Indochina, the U.S. would continue to assure, the French of the international interest of the Indochina effort; use U.S. influence to promote political, military, economic, and social policies; provide increased aid in the absence of overt Chinese aggression; oppose French withdrawal; and seek collective action against Red China intervention. NSC 124/2, 25 June 1952	520
171.	The U.S. and Britain discuss issuing a "warning to Red China on intervention in Indochina. French successes could trigger Chinese intervention and the U.S. had "no infantry available for operations within Indochina." The U.S. thinking is along the lines of a naval blockade of China's coast. London Ministerial Talks, 26 June 1952	535
172.	The French request that 150 American Air Force mechanics be detailed to Vietnam receives an opinion for favorable action from General Trapnell, MAAG Chief, who also recommends expediting delivery of aircraft promised for 1953. Saigon 1149 to Acheson, 5 December 1952	538
173.	The U.S. approves participation of 25-30 USAF personnel in maintenance of French aircraft in Vietnam. Acheson 1286 to Saigon, 22 December 1952	540