Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 2. b.djvu/269

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Copy 3 of 10 copies.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

DATE: March 28, 1952
SUBJECT: Interview with British Ambassador; Secretary's Presentation of Preliminary Views Concerning British Memorandum of March 15th Regarding Indochina
PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador
Mr. Gibson, PSA
COPIES TO: The Secretary
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S/P
EUR (2)
FE
S/S


After the customary amenities, the Secretary proceeded to give response to the British memorandum of March 15th, point by point, as outlined in Mr. Allison's guidance memorandum of March 25th. After he had finished the Ambassador expressed his thanks and asked if he might summarize the Secretary's presentation in order to check. He did so as follows:

"We do not believe that the British concern regarding French intentions in Indochina is justified and cite Mr. Letourneau's comments made at his press conference March 12th to substantiate our point of view. We have no evidence that any of the rumors cited in the British memorandum as indications of French intention to negotiate with Ho Chi Minh or withdraw from Indochina are true. We would be gratified to have proof of any or of all of them. If it were obtained we would consider it necessary to reconsider our policy concerning the French and Indochina generally. We believe that the French will stay in Indochina providing they have: (a) assurances of continued US military aid, (b) sufficient financial aid to assist them with that portion of their budgetary deficit attributable to the Indochina operation and, (c) reason to expect that a solution can be found to their manpower problem. It is suggested that this solution lies in the formation of national armies. We do not believe that the French are negotiating with Ho Chi Minh if only for the reason that Ho does not choose to negotiate and could not even if he wished to do so. We do not believe that the French are planning a withdrawal if only for the reason that such an operation could not be accomplished successfully without the assistance of the British and ourselves. We

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