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TitleUnited States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense, Part V. B. 1.
AuthorThe Pentagon
Year2011
PublisherU.S. Government
LocationWashington, D.C.
Sourcedjvu
ProgressTo be proofread
TransclusionIndex not transcluded or unreviewed
Volumes

V.B.1


JUSTIFICATION OF THE WAR -- INTERNAL COMMITMENTS


The Roosevelt Administration, 1940 – 1945


Contents and

Chronological List of Documents


1940 Page
1. U.S. views on Japan's demands concerning French Indochina are given to the French Embassy. Memorandum by Mr. Dunn (Political Adviser) to Under Secretary Welles, 6 August 1940 1
2. Welles instructs Ambassador Grew to convey to the Japanese that the U.S. was "seriously perturbed" over Japanese demands concerning Indochina. Welles 293 to Tokyo, 6 August 1940 3
1941
3. Mr. Cecil Gray, Assistant to the Secretary of State, reports on Secretary Hull's view of the Japanese occupation of Indochina. The occupation was seen as a threat to trade routes of "supreme importance to the United States." Secretary Hull also remarks to Sumner Welles that "the Japanese are seeking to dominate militarily practically one-half the world.…" and will continue "unless something happens to stop her." Two memoranda by Mr. Cecil Gray, 24 and 25 July 1941 4
4. President Roosevelt proposes to the Japanese Ambassador to neutralize Indochina, creating in effect an Asian "Switzerland." Memorandum by Sumner Welles of conversation between Roosevelt and the Japanese Ambassador, 24 July 1941 8
5. U.S. publicly declares that the agreement between France and Japan regarding Indochina was unjustified. State Department press release, 2 August 1941 11
6. U.S. proposes to Japan that the two countries endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among Britain, China, Japan, Netherlands, Russia, Thailand, and the United States which would respect the territorial integrity of Indochina. Cordell Hull to Ambassador Nomura (Japan), 26 November 1941 13
7. President Roosevelt expresses to Emperor Hirohito that continuance of the Japanese troop movements into Indochina is "unthinkable." Message from Roosevelt to Hirohito, 6 December 1941 14
1942
8. U.S. assures France that she will be restored to full independence "in all the greatness and vastness" which she possessed before the war in Europe and in her colonies overseas. Letter from Mr. Murphy to General Giraud, 2 November 1942. (Other U.S. policy statements for 1942 are quoted in Document No. 11, page iv, following) 16
1943
9. There follows a series of commuications concerning the use of Chinese troops in Indochina. The U.S. rejected the French protestations and contended that the problem was primarily military. (President Roosevelt's decision was influential in the eventual Chinese occupation of Tonkin and their subsequent replacement by the French.) 17
a. Expressions of concern over Chinese participation in the liberation of Indochina by the French Committee of National Liberation. M. Henri Hoppenot memorandum to Mr. Adolph Berle, Assistant Secretary of State, 20 October 1943
18
b. Mr. Berle expresses to the French that it is a military problem but privately expresses the fact that Chinese intervention forces the issue of Western colonialism versus Eastern liberation as a policy. Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. Berle, 21 October 1943
18
c. Berle writes to Edward Stettinius, Under Secretary of State, that military matters must predominate because if the Chinese do not intervene, then the U.S. must reconquer Indochina single-handed and later police and protect it against the Chinese. Memorandum by Berle to Stettinius, 22 October 1943
19
d. Mr. John Carter Vincent, Assistant Chief of Far Eastern Affairs, views the post-war status of Indochina as a matter of speculation but does not rule out the influence of the Chinese. Memorandum by Vincent to Berle, 2 November 1943
20
e. Stettinius recommends to the President that the problem is primarily military. Memorandum by Stettinius to President Roosevelt, 8 November 1943
21
f. President Roosevelt defers judgment on Chinese involvement and leaves the whole matter to the "discretion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" as essentially a military problem. Memorandum by President Roosevelt to Stettinius, 9 November 1943
21
g. The French offer a renewed expression of concern over the apparent intent to use Chinese troops in Indochina and a last minute warning of dire consequences to the Allied cause if the Chinese were used. Letter from M. Hoppenot to Berle, 13 December 1943
22
10. President Roosevelt conversation with Marshal Stalin on the possibility of a trusteeship for Indochina which he had discussed with Chiang Kai-shek. Extract from Tehran Conference, 28 November 1943 24
1944
11. Secretary Hull conveys British interest in U.S. policy on French Indochina to Roosevelt with summaries of stated U.S. and British positions. The U.S. had continuously promised to restore to France its independence and sovereignty over its territorial possessions. The British, on the other hand, avoided guarantees of "French Empire" integrity but alluded to the "greatness of France" and the lack of British designs on French territory, 14 January 1944 26
12. Roosevelt reiterates his opinion to the British that Indochina should not go back to France and that he was supported by Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek in this view. Memorandum by Roosevelt to Secretary of State, 24 January 1944 30
13. Stettinius seeks approval from Roosevelt to assume that French armed forces or French nationals would be used in the liberation of Indochina without prejudicing the question of ultimate status. Memorandum by Stettinius to Roosevelt, 17 February 1944 31
14. Views of President Roosevelt with respect to setting up a trusteeship for Indochina and expressions of these views to the British are summarized. Memorandum by Mr. Grew, Far East Affairs, 10 July 1944 32
15. Cordell Hull seeks a decision from Roosevelt on the French role in the Far East military operations. The British had requested of Hull affirmative answers on the attachment of a French Mission to Mountbatten and the establishment of a Corps in India. Memorandum by Hull to Roosevelt, 26 August 1944 34
16. Roosevelt defers decision on French role in the Far East until after the Second Quebec Conference, 11-16 September 1944. Memorandum by Roosevelt to Hull, 28 August 1944 35
17. Hull follows-up with a new request to Roosevelt for decision with the information that the British were going ahead with bringing a French Mission into South East Asia Command (SEAC) and other activities to get them installed. Memorandum by Hull to Roosevelt, 10 October 1944 35
18. Secretary Hull requests Roosevelt's decision on rendering support to resistance groups, both French and native, in Indochina. Memorandum by Hull to Roosevelt, 13 October 1944 36
19. Roosevelt decides that the U.S. "should do nothing in regard to resistance groups or in any other way in relation to Indochina." Memorandum by Roosevelt to Hull, 16 October 1944 37
20. Anthony Eden's views on the question of trusteeship for Indochina. Memorandum by H. F. Mathews, Office of European Affairs, 2 November 1944 37
21. Stettinius summarizes recent developments in relation to Indochina for President Roosevelt. Among the points covered was that the O.S.S. representative in SEAC reported that British, French, and Dutch strategy appeared to be to win back control of Southeast Asia with U.S. resources but "foreclosing the Americans from any voice in policy matters." Memorandum by Hull to Roosevelt, 2 November 1944 38
22. Roosevelt appears adamant in a four point reply to Secretary of State; it was to be made clear that the U.S. had made no final decisions on, and expected to be consulted by the British, Dutch and French with regard to any future of Southeast Asia. Memorandum by Roosevelt to Stettinius, 3 November 1944 40
23. France expresses strong interest in participating in recovery of Indochina. Caffrey 316 to Hull, 4 November 1944 40
24. British aide-memoire covers proposals for the use of French forces in pre-operational activities in Indochina. Halifax letter to Stettinius, 23 November 1944 41
25. Stettinius informs Roosevelt of British impatience over lack of U.S. reply to aide-memoire; the British were concerned that the U.S. had not determined an Indochina policy and could hardly keep the French out in light of their increasing strength. Memorandum by Stettinius to Roosevelt, 27 December 1944 43
1945
26. Stettinius notes Roosevelt's refusal to get "mixed up in any military effort" in Indochina -- with the rejoinder that action at this time was premature. Extract from Stettinius diary, 1 January 1945 45
27. Stettinius informs Halifax that Roosevelt did not agree with sending French agents to Indochina. Memorandum of Conversation, Stettinius-Halifax, 2 January 1945 46
28. Secretary of War Stimson replies to State Department query whether U.S. actions in Indochina were consistent with Roosevelt's instructions. Stimson letter to Stettinius, 2 January 1945 47
29. Harriman reviews Soviet attitudes ("hostility to colonial exploitation and domination of native peoples by foreign imperialism") and assesses intentions in Russian relations ("not to consent cheerfully to any further establishment of Western military and naval power in that area") regarding French colonialism and the future of Indochina. Harriman (Moscow) 118 to Stettinius, 13 January 1945 48
30. Patrick J. Hurley reports on Indochina situation; General Wedemeyer has maintained a "non-committal policy vis-a-vis Indochina." Hurley 177 to Stettinius, 6 February 1945 58
31. Roosevelt discusses Indochina trusteeship with Stalin at Yalta. Extract of Roosevelt-Stalin Yalta Conversations, 8 February 1945 59
32. Hurley forwards a "note" from the French Provisional Government concerning de Gaulle's position on Indochina. Hurley despatch 111 to Stettinius, 31 January 1945 (State Department 14 February 1945) 60
33. Caffrey reports General de Gaulle's distress over the lack of U.S. support to French resistance in Indochina. "What are you driving at?…We do not want to become Communist.…I hope that you do not push us into it." Caffrey 1196 to Stettinius, 13 March 1945 65
34. Stettinius seeks Roosevelt's approval of a proposed statement to the effect that the U.S. "Will do all it can to support resistance groups." Memorandum by Stettinius for Roosevelt, 16 March 1945 66
35. Roosevelt declines to issue the statement proposed by Stettinius (on U.S. support of resistance groups) as "inadvisable." Memorandum by Leahy to Hull, 17 March 1945 68
36. Admiral Leahy authorizes the War Department to give General Wedemeyer approval to send whatever assistance "can be spared without interfering with the war effort" to the French resistance forces in Indochina. Memorandum of Conversation, Assistant Secretary Dunn, 19 March 1945 69
37. U.S. assistance through 14th Air Force to French resistance in Indochina is approved provided such assistance does not interfere with planned operations. Paraphrase of Wedemeyer to Chennault message, 19 March 1945 71
38. Stettinius relates U.S. policy to the French Ambassador on furnishing assistance to resistance groups in Indochina. Stettinius to Bonnet, 4 April 1945 72
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