This page needs to be proofread.
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
| Page | ||
| 149. | The first progress report on NSC 64, which was approved on 27 March 1950, assesses the most severe threat to French Indochina as the increased capability of the Viet Minh resulting from Red Chinese aid. Optimistically, the report concludes that "American military aid furnished the State's forces and the Army of the French Union may have been the decisive factor in the preservation of the area against communist aggression." State Department Memorandum to NSC, 15 March 1951 | 421 |
| 150. | President Truman approves NSC Action 48/5 which states U.S. policy on Asia. With respect to Indochina, U.S. policy seeks to continue to increase French military effectiveness, to encourage internal autonomy, and to promote international support for the three Associated States. NSC 48/5, 17 May 1951 | 425 |
| 151. | Dulles discusses problems with Parodi of participation of the three Associated States as "sovereign" with respect to U.N. membership, Viet Minh rival government, and positions of India, Burma, and Indonesia. Dulles-Parodi Conversation, 11 June 1951 | 446 |
| 152. | The U.S. invites Vietnam, Cambodia, end Laos to participate in signing of Japanese Peace Treaty. Saigon 132 despatch to State, 6 September 1951 | 447 |
| 153. | The U.S. and Vietnam enter into an economic cooperation agreement. Agreement entered into force 7 September 1951 | 449 |
| 154. | The U.S. agrees with France that they will continue to be primarily responsible for Indochina, that U.S. troops should not be used, and that first priority in military aid should go to Indochina. U.S.-France Foreign Ministers Meeting, 11 September 1951 | 452 |
| 155. | President Truman and Secretary Acheson pledge support for General DeLattre and that "we would not let Indochina fall into enemy hands." Memorandum of Conversation, Acheson, Schuman, and DeLattre, 14 September 1951 | 454 |
| 156. | General DeLattre comments to the State Department that the aid program had not been working out satisfactorily due to the "missionary zeal" of certain "young men" which made it appear that the U.S. was extending its influence. State Department Discussions with DeLattre, 17 September 1951 | 456 |
xxiii
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
