Page:Pentagon-Papers-Part V. B. 2. b.djvu/61

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Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011

751G.00/3-2950:SECRET FILE

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRET


6 P.M.
MAR 29 1950


AMEMBASSY,

PARIS
1363

Dept has predicated its course of action in Indochina since FEB 2 this year on assumption that fundamental objectives of US and Franco in Indochina are in substantial coincidence. Dept assumes:

1. That French are determined to protect IC from further COMMIE encroachments by POLIT, ECON as veil as MIL measures.

2. That French understand that success of MIL operation, i.e. containment of northern border against COMMIE penetration as veil as reduction of Ho's forces elsewhere IC, depends, in the end on overcoming opposition of indigenous population.

3. Therefore France proposes in support of this policy to strengthen Bao Dai and the Kings of Laos and Cambodia in every practical way, to end that non-COMMIE nationalists abandon Ho, support Bao Dai and Kings and can thus reduce guerrilla activity.

It is evident from reaction Asian states to US and FR effort to secure their recognition Bao Dai, from attitude Scandinavian powers and from reactions US press that large segment public opinion both East and West continues to regard Bao Dai and two Kings as French puppets not enjoying nor likely to enjoy degree of autonomy within FR Union accorded then under MAR 8 agreements, analogous to that accorded INDO by NETH.

US Govt has used its POLIT resources and is now engaged in measures to accelerate its ECON and financial assistance to IC states. As you know Dept has requested Joint Chiefs of Staff to QTE assess the strategic aspects of the situation and consider, from the mil point of view, how the United States can best contribute to the prevention of further Communist encroachment in that area. UNQTE You are of course familiar with position Jessup has takes RE SEA during his recent tour. Dept accordingly considers that its position is clear and that the character of its past actions and proposed undertakings justifies its suggesting to FR a course of action which it believes requisite to success of operation Indochina.

SECRET

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