NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
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taken and that the British and French will support the action.
It would seem inappropriate to make a decision as to our willingness to go to war without having fully explored the military implications. It would appear desirable for you to take the position that the Defense Department is not prepared to make such a recommendation to the President until it is satisfied that the military implications are acceptable and it had full opportunity to explain its findings end conclusions to the Council and the President.
4. That you raise the question whether, in view of the crucial importance of reaching agreement with the French and British, the Council should contemplate reaching a firm national policy decision before such negotiations are undertaken.
In view of the great complexities of the problem involved and the heavy reliance we necessarily must place on our allies in regard to SEA, it would be perhaps more sensible to postpone a final Government decision on SEA policy until after further exploratory talks with the British and French — either on the Governmental or the political-military level.
5. That you indicate that in your view it is unnecessary and unwise for us to contemplate unilateral action against Communist-China under present circumstances; and in view of the possibility of leaks, etc., you would prefer that no reference be made to this possibility in the present NSC policy paper. You might point out that as far as overt aggression is concerned, our main objective is to deter it by a joint warning. We should not engage in a bluff. The primary need is, therefore, to reach sufficient agreement with the U.K. and France as to courses of action to permit the issuance of such a warning.
6. That you express the view that the present paper concentrates far too heavily on action to be taken against aggression; that by far the greater danger is that Southeast Asia will fall to subversive tactics; that in the absence of overt aggression it is probable that before long France will be unable or unwilling to continue to carry the burdens of the civil war; that the paper proposes no courses of action to meet these contingencies which are commensurate with the burdens and risks which it proposes we assume to deal with the lesser risk of aggression; and that you propose that this deficiency in the paper be remedied by the Senior Staff in their next draft.
This is a major deficiency in the proposed policy. If nothing is to be done beyond what is now being done to prevent Communist subversion in this area, there is grave doubt as to the wisdom of assuming
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