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POLSELLI v. IRS

Opinion of the Court

founding question, see Viewtech, 653 F. 3d, at 1106—is neither here nor there. The IRS could not, of course, use records of canceled checks and the like to satisfy Mr. Polselli’s tax deficiency. But if those records showed that money from Dolce Hotel Management was used to pay Mr. Polselli’s account at Abraham & Rose, or to pay others through Abraham & Rose, that could aid in collecting funds from Dolce Hotel Management to help pay Mr. Polselli’s debt to the IRS. Or the Service could use those records to try to identify other alter egos—besides Dolce Hotel Management—where Mr. Polselli might have hidden assets.

By the same token, the summonses Bryant issued to the three banks sought records to “identify … entities whose funds Mr. Polselli has control over without formal ownership” and “bank accounts associated with such entities.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 68a. As with the request Bryant issued to Abraham & Rose, even if the three bank summonses did not reveal bank accounts in which Mr. Polselli has a legal interest, they could lead to assets parked elsewhere that the IRS could collect to satisfy his $2 million liability.

IRS investigations are much like any other: A detective might order forensic testing or speak to witnesses to help identify a culprit, even if those activities are unlikely—in and of themselves—to solve the crime. Similarly, documents in the accounts belonging to Mrs. Polselli or Dolce Hotel Management may be a step in a paper trail leading to assets owned by Mr. Polselli. Everyday tasks illustrate the same point: A recipe might help a chef shop for needed groceries, even though more steps are required before dinner will be ready. By conflating activities that help advance a goal with activities sure to accomplish it, petitioners ignore the typical meaning of “in aid of.”

Petitioners next argue that the exception provided in clause (i) must be read narrowly so as to avoid making entirely superfluous the exception found in clause (ii). Clause (i) excuses notice when the IRS issues a summons “in aid of