Opinion of the Court
B
Petitioners advance two primary arguments in support of their proposed legal interest test, neither of which convinces us to abandon an ordinary reading of the notice exception.
First, petitioners adopt a narrow definition of “in aid of the collection.” In their view, the phrase refers only to inquiries that “directly advance” the IRS’s collection efforts. Brief for Petitioners 21. A summons will not directly advance those efforts, they contend, unless it is targeted at an account containing assets that the IRS can collect to satisfy the taxpayer’s liability. And, petitioners say, the only way that a summons issued to a third party will produce collectible assets is if the delinquent taxpayer has a legal interest in the targeted account.
This argument does not give a fair reading to the phrase “in aid of the collection.” According to petitioners, the phrase requires that a summons produce collectible assets. But to “aid” means “[t]o help” or “assist.” American Heritage Dictionary 26 (1969). Petitioners agree. See Brief for Petitioners 21 (“aid” means to “support,” “help,” or “assist”). Even if a summons may not itself reveal taxpayer assets that can be collected, it may nonetheless help the IRS find such assets.
Consider this case. The IRS’s investigation “suggest[ed] that Mr. Polselli often uses other entities to shield assets from the Internal Revenue Service.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 68a. Bryant suspected, for instance, that Mr. Polselli was using Dolce Hotel Management as an alter ego, and also that he might have access to and use of Mrs. Polselli’s bank accounts. Based on those leads, Bryant initially requested that Abraham & Rose produce “cancelled checks, wire transfer/credit documents, and all other instruments used by Mr. Polselli to pay the firm.” Id., at 67a. Whether Mr. Polselli maintains a “legal interest” in those records—a con-
