Wilson administration. If they had acquiesced in a moderate reduction of duties in 1909, it is probable that they would have been spared the heavier reduction in 1913. If they had permitted the Payne bill to pass the Senate substantially as it passed the House, in place of amending it until it is doubtful whether it revised the tariff upward or downward, the country would probably have accepted the measure as a satisfactory settlement of the question. By overreaching themselves they incensed public opinion and invited a more thoroughgoing reduction of duties.
Among the arguments against protection is that it inevitably makes business the football of politics. When the tariff is under discussion, business usually slows down until the outcome is foreseen. The average tariff has a short life. Moreover, discussion that does not end in legislation often disturbs business as much as that which does. As a consequence, the protected industries seldom enjoy a long respite from the uncertainty which the discussion of the tariff necessarily entails. The history of the tariff since the Civil War, however, indicates that in the end the protected interests have usually come out on top. After the war, the internal revenue duties on many commodities of domestic production were either reduced or abolished without any corresponding reduction in the import duties. In other words, the margin of protection was substantially increased. The attempt to reduce duties in 1867 was unsuccessful. The reduction of ten per cent, in duties in 1872 was repealed in 1875. The act of 1883 lowered some duties and raised others, but it left the protective system substantially intact. Mr. Cleveland's famous message in 1887 urging a reduction of duties ended in the McKinley act raising duties to a new high level. The democratic tariff of 1894 reduced duties so slightly that Mr. Cleveland refused to sign it. In 1897, the McKinley duties were practically restored, and it is doubtful whether the act of 1909 made any reduction in the average level of duties that served a protective purpose. During all these years, moreover, besides the ad valorem duties that were avowedly protective, an additional amount of protection was concealed in specific duties that purported merely to compensate for the tariff on raw materials. As parliamentarians and political strategists, the protected interests have been more resourceful than their adversaries. The alliances between wool growers, woolen manufacturers and other interests have repeatedly carried the day. The tariff of 1913 marks practically the first discomfiture the advocates of protection have suffered since 1860.
But perhaps the discomfiture is more apparent than real. Taking the country over, the business interests have shown little concern over the reduction of duties. There has been less alarm than preceding the tariff of 1894. With the exception of a few industries, the volume of business has continued at a high level. The net earnings of many industries and of some railways have increased. Apparently, a high tariff
