Page:Report on the Shrivenham train crash of 15 January 1936 - MoT Shrivenham1936.pdf/7

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With regard to the times when the guard arrived in my box 5.58 a.m., he showed me his watch and said that my clock was two minutes slow by his watch. I let it stay, as I knew my clock for some time had been losing anything up to 2 or 2 minutes per day, as the booking shows. Here is the booking on Saturday, January 11th, to the effect that the clock was 2 minutes slow at 11.0 a.m."

Head had accepted the down empty stock train at 5.21 a.m. (5.19 a.m. in his register), and it entered the section at Ashbury Crossing at 5.26 a. . (5.24 a.m. in his register) under clear signals, at which time, or half a minute later according to Head, he threw up his signals against it; he thought "it was possibly a minute or a minute and a half to two minutes before that, that I heard a bang."

It may be inferred from this estimate that the collision occurred between 5.24 a.m. and 5.25½ a.m., on the other hand, there is Head's former statement that the bang was heard about a minute after he received, at about 5.22 a.m., the Entering-Section signal for the express. As, however, the express, travelling at 50 to 60 m.p.h., can hardly have taken less than two minutes to cover the distance from Marston Crossing to the point of collision, nearly two miles, there seems little doubt that the collision did not, in fact, take place much before 5.24 a.m., as is also apparent from Guard Rapson's evidence.

7. Driver F. Gould, of the down empty stock train, stated, and his fireman, H. J. Howard, confirmed, that they passed the Shrivenham down distant and home signals in the clear position; but they fortunately noticed that Head had reversed the starter, and the train was brought to a stand just beyond it and adjacent to the box. After ascertaining what had happened, they proceeded to the site of the accident, with one coach, under instructions from Inspector Willmott, and rendered valuable assistance to Cozens and others in releasing Driver Starr. Gould referred to changes in visibility, as follows:-It was slightly misty on each side of Shrivenham, "visibility looking through the eye-glass being between 200 and 300 yards" while it was practically clear running through the station.

8. Signalman E. F. Jefferies, of Ashbury Crossing, had also booked on duty at 10.0 p.m. the previous evening. He diverted the mineral train on to the up goods loop; to allow the express to overtake it; such diversion was usually carried out at Ashbury Crossing and not at Shrivenham.

Jefferies received the Entering-Section signal for this train from Head at 5.14 a.m. (5.16 a.m. in his register), and he transmitted the same signal forward to Knighton Crossing at 5.15 a.m. (5.17 a.m. in his register). He stated, and it is confirmed by Driver Davis, that the train entered the loop at about 5 m.p.h., at this time, but it was not until 5.18 a.m. (5.20 a.m. in his register) that he transmitted the Out-of-Section signal for the train to Head (who recorded receipt at 5.17 a.m.).

The last-mentioned time is of importance with regard to Jefferies' responsibility, and to the running of the express, the corrected times of which are as follows:- Head's acceptance of the train is recorded at that time, 5.18 a.m.., as already stated, and Jefferies accepted it a minute later, at 5.19 a.m. (5.21 a.m. in his register); but the train did not enter the section at Marston Crossing till 5.22 a.m., when Head transmitted the approach signal to Jefferies (who recorded receipt at 5.25 a.m.). There was therefore an interval of as much as 4 minutes between the time Jefferies transmitted the Out-of-Section signal for the mineral train, and the entry of the express into the section at Marston Crossing.

Jefferies' account is as follows:—

"At 5.15 a.m. (5.17 a.m. by his register) I put the 10.30 a.m. coal train Aberdare to Old Oak Common up the avoiding line to Knighton Crossing. I watched part of the train by and was then called in the 'phone. On returning to the window the coal train had passed, and I thought I saw the tail lamp. I thought I saw a white light which the guard had changed. Before I gave Train-out-of-Section for clearing the coal train, I followed the practice I had always done in this short section; I looked to satisfy myself that there was nothing between myself and Shrivenham. I do not do this as an alternative to my observing the tail lamp. I can see through the section.
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