Page:Report on the Shrivenham train crash of 15 January 1936 - MoT Shrivenham1936.pdf/8

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Later Signalman Head sent me the Emergency signal and informed me that wagons were passing him; I cannot say what time it was. I turned these up the avoiding lines and turned back to main as soon as they cleared the points, thinking the express would be close. What I cannot remove from my mind is the fact that I feel positive I saw a white light up the loop which I thought the guard had changed on entering. My reference to this means the white side light which would have been changed from red by the guard on entering the loop. ...

With regard to my telephone conversation, Swindon West Box rung me up; the conversation started after I watched, a part of the train go by. I could not say how long it lasted, nor could I say who the actual person was with whom I spoke. Usually the boy answers, but I do not know his name. He told me that the Gwinear was behind the Penzance. I said 'All right', and that finished the conversation. I stood with my back to the line talking into the telephone, which is attached to the back wall of my box. After the conversation ceased I went to the open window at the London end of my box from which I had previously been observing the train."

By that time the train had passed, and Jefferies thought that the "engine was perhaps near the starter," 492 yards from the box. He was unable to say definitely whether he could have seen the tail light (had it existed) from where he was standing at the telephone, but inspection appeared to indicate that he might have been able to do so, though through closed windows.

Conclusion.

9. The division at the rear of this heavy mineral train was caused by the failure, through the Gedge slot, of the trailing drawhook on a 12-ton wagon, owned by Messrs. Stephenson Clarke and Associated Companies, Ltd. The hook was of standard construction, 15 years old, and the material, wrought iron, appears to have conformed with the specification in force at the time of manufacture; the wagon bad been plated as recently as September, 1932, in accordance with the 7-yearly General Repair Programme.

No question arises with regard to the proper functioning of the drawgear; the failure was due to the poor shock-resisting property of the material, and, having regard to the existence of a small, but not growing, flaw, low temperature was probably a contributory cause. The flaw could not have been observed under any normal system of examination.

There seems to have been no feature with regard to the operation of the train which contributed to the fracture of this hook; speed at the time was at least 20 m.p.h., on a falling gradient of 1 in 834, and on an easy right-handed curve of 350 ch. radius. I conclude that the failure was the result of fatigue, and that no responsibility rests upon Driver D. G. Davis or Fireman P.T.G. Jenkins, who only became aware of the division when the train was stopped by signal at Knighton Crossing.

10. The express entered the section under clear signals at 5.22 a.m.; the wagons were standing nearly 2 miles away, and 444 yards ahead of the Shrivenham distant signal, which had also been cleared, Even if speed had then been as high as 60 m.p.h. (which is doubtful according to the evidence), the collision could not have taken place much before 5.24 a.m.

I have no reason to doubt that Driver E. A. Starr and Fireman J. H. Cozens were on the alert. Evidently they received the Automatic Train Control audible clear signal in their cab at a point 455 yards (little more than l5 seconds) before reaching the clear distant signal, and had no suspicion of impending disaster. According to the evidence, visibility through the eye-glans at the time may have been restricted to no more than 300 yards, and it was probably not till after passing the distant signal, in the intervening 444 yards, that Starr observed the red tail and side lights, and realised the danger.

The overturning of the engine caused the more violent stoppage of the train and the greater damage to the rolling stock. While Cozens was very fortunate to escape, Starr could not be released for two lours and evidently acted with great fortitude before succumbing to his injuries. He was 52 years of age, and had 38 years' service with an exceedingly good record as a main line driver.