- to the death of 500 people over five days in the rural town of Moura.[1] Corinne Dufka, Sahel director at Human Rights Watch, called this the “worst [atrocity] in Mali in a decade”.[2] UK Government officials directly linked the arrival of Wagner fighters to Mali’s deteriorating human rights situation in early 2022.[3]
In CAR and Mali, Wagner fighters are documented as having targeted civilians at a significantly higher rate than both state forces and major insurgent or terrorist groups in those countries.[4]The destabilising effects of Wagner engagement have been underlined by the United States[5] and European Union.[6] The UK Government stated that Wagner fighters [emphasis added]:
…undermine security and do not offer any kind of credible long-term approach […] Wagner has also interfered in African politics by protecting and supporting military regimes and weakening democratic processes […] The deployment of proxy military forces such as Wagner undermines international law and […] The Wagner Group is a driver of conflict and capitalises on instability for its own interests [...] Wagner has committed human rights abuses, undermined the work of international peacekeepers, and sought control of mineral resources, to the detriment of local citizens and their economy.[7]
19. Dr Sorcha MacLeod, Chair of the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, told us it is “almost impossible” to hold “mercenaries and mercenary-type actors” to account for their crimes.[8] Wagner deployments foster a “context of impunity”.[9] This is because:
- ↑ OHCHR, ‘Rapport sur les évènements de Moura du 27 au 31 mars 2022’ (French only), May 2023, paras 20–21, 77. See also United States Department of State, The Release of the UN Report on Moura, Mali, 15 May 2023 (accessed 10 July 2023): “We commend the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights for its diligence and tenacity in investigating these abuses, which include gang rape and other sexual violence, torture, and extrajudicial killings.”
- ↑ Russian mercenaries and Mali army accused of killing 300 civilians, The Guardian, 5 April 2022. Note there have been allegations of Wagner-linked violence in other towns: Nioni, Hombori, Mondoro and Boni. See Russian mercenaries linked to civilian massacres in Mali, The Guardian, 4 May 2022
- ↑ Russian mercenaries linked to civilian massacres in Mali, The Guardian, 4 May 2022
- ↑ Civilian targeting accounted for 52% and 71% of Wagner involvement in political violence in CAR and Mali respectively. By comparison, in CAR, 17% of state forces’ political violence events targeted civilians and 42% of rebels’ political violence events targeted civilians. ‘Rebels’ in CAR refers to CPC/UPC. In Mali, 20% of states forces’ political violence events targeted civilians and 27% of rebels’ political violence events targeted civilians. ‘Rebels’ in Mali refers to the Al Qaeda-affiliated JNIM. Data collected by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), covering the timeframe between 1 December 2021 and 31 July 2022 for Mali and the timeframe between 1 January 2018 and 31 July 2022 for CAR. The data is presented in Wagner Group Operations in Africa: Civilian Targeting Trends in the Central African Republic and Mali, ACLED, 30 August 2022
- ↑ “The Wagner Group is a destabilizing force whose personnel have engaged in an ongoing pattern of abuses, including execution-style killings, sexual violence, and torture in Mali and other nations struggling with instability.” United States Department of State, The Release of the UN Report on Moura, Mali, 15 May 2023 (accessed 10 July 2023)
- ↑ Council of the EU, ‘Wagner Group: Council adds 11 individuals and 7 entities to EU sanctions lists’, 25 February 2023 (accessed 10 July 2023)
- ↑ Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025) section 7
- ↑ Q19 [Sorcha MacLeod]
- ↑ Stated in the context of Libya: ReliefWeb, Libya: Violations related to mercenary activities must be investigated, 17 June 2020 (accessed 10 July 2023)
