Guns for gold:the Wagner Network exposed
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- Other than Ukraine, the Wagner Network often holds political sway in the countries where its fighters operate.[7] It is also usually present at the explicit request of the host Government, which can result in a desire by national authorities to hide atrocities. This situation undermines the independence of national investigations and makes complaints less likely,[8] especially where judicial independence is poor;
- Wagner-like bodies and PMCs generally do not fit easily into the existing
international legal framework.[12] Many have not subscribed to international voluntary initiatives promoting responsible activity (paragraph 79).
The response of the UK Government to the de facto impunity of Wagner fighters is discussed later in this report (paragraph 81)
- ↑ Q40 [Christo Grozev]
- ↑ The regular armed forces have “systems of accountability, clear chains of command, military codes of justice and courts martial”. Among mercenary groups, “the chains of command are not clear. There is opacity and lack of transparency around these types of actors—deliberately so.” Q19 [Sorcha MacLeod]
- ↑ A former fighter stated this in an interview with the Guardian. See ‘Mercenaries have skills armies lack’: former Wagner operative opens up, The Guardian, 10 February 2022
- ↑ Mercenary groups “operate in the shadows for good reason. They do not wear clear uniforms or clear insignia. It is very difficult to identify who they are, […] if you are a victim or the family of a victim or a human rights defender”. Q19 [Sorcha MacLeod]
- ↑ A new entity has been registered in Russia, however.
- ↑ Q25 [Sorcha MacLeod].
- ↑ Proelium Law (WGN0016) para 16. For examples from CAR and Sudan, see The Sentry (WGN0017) para 15; OHCHR, ‘CAR: Experts alarmed by government’s use of “Russian trainers”, close contacts with UN peacekeepers’, 31 March 2021 (accessed 8 July 2023); Dossier Center (WGN0009) para 36.
- ↑ This is well-documented in the Central African Republic, where victims, journalists and human rights defenders have faced harassment and intimidation. Wagner operatives have worked closely with police and/or local authorities to undermine investigations. Q42 [Sorcha MacLeod]; Dossier Center (WGN0009) para 56; Final report of the UN Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2536 (2020), para 95, available in Letter dated 25 June 2021 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to resolution 2536 (2020) addressed to the President of the Security Council, 25 June 2021.
- ↑ A civilian in Homs, Syria, was tortured and murdered in 2017, with likely Wagner involvement. The victim’s family tried to bring a claim via Russian courts and “the decision not to investigate was upheld at all levels”. The UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries is “extremely concerned about the delays and obstacles that were put in the path of access to justice for the family of the victim”. Q20 [Sorcha MacLeod]
- ↑ Russia vetoed efforts to establish an independent UN investigation into atrocities in Mali. Russian mercenaries linked to civilian massacres in Mali, The Guardian, 4 May 2022
- ↑ The UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries sent allegation letters to the Russian government on Libya and CAR, but Russia responded that mercenaries and private military and security companies are illegal under Russian law, meaning the allegations were impossible. Q23 [Sorcha MacLeod]
- ↑ The UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries sent allegation letters to the Russian government on Libya and CAR, but Russia responded that mercenaries and private military and security companies are illegal under Russian law, meaning the allegations were impossible. Q23 [Sorcha MacLeod]