39. Supporting Ukraine militarily is the Government’s priority when it comes to countering the Wagner Network. We fully support the continued supply of defence assistance and wider support to Ukraine as it fights to liberate itself from Russian illegal occupation. Through this, the UK has enabled Ukrainian Armed Forces to challenge Wagner fighters directly, often resulting in a high rate of attrition.
40. However, it is a significant failing to see the Wagner Network primarily through the prism of Europe, not least given its geographic spread, the impact of its activities on UK interests further abroad, and the fact that its wealth creation sits largely in Africa.
41. The Government believes that it is becoming more important to consider the network’s activities, although it did not say where it would do so. In February 2023, the FCDO told us there was now “much more activity” in Government to understand and respond to the network than there had been six months earlier. The Government also said it had surged resources into the Russia Unit over the last year.
42. The Wagner Network began its activities in 2014. By early 2022, when the Government began to invest greater resource in understanding the network, Wagner fighters had already undertaken military deployments in at least seven countries. It is deeply regrettable that it took this long, and that the Government continues to give so little focus to countries beyond Ukraine. This leaves us even less prepared to respond to the evolution of this notoriously shape-shifting network.
Specific actions taken by the UK Government
Tracking and sanctioning
43. The FCDO’s geographical Directorates track and respond to the activities of ‘Private Military Companies’, working with the Ministry of Defence.[1]At a minimum, this work covers the network’s military activities in Ukraine.[2] The intelligence on its activities in Africa appears more limited. Ben Fender acknowledged a lack of “granular understanding” of the network’s numbers in Africa, but added: “it doesn’t look as if it is growing—it is certainly not growing fast”.[3]The Minister emphasised the need not to over-estimate the
- ↑ The Minister of Defence “works across HMG to enable evidence sharing to support sanctioning of those involved in malign PMC activity”. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025) sections 4–5
- ↑ Such activities have been the regular subject of public updates from Defence Intelligence since the start of the full-scale Russia-Ukraine war For example, Ministry of Defence (via Twitter), ’Defence Intelligence update on the situation in Ukraine – 28 March 2022’ (accessed 17 July 2023); Ministry of Defence (via Twitter), ‘Defence Intelligence update on the situation in Ukraine – 3 February 2023’ (accessed 17 July 2023)
- ↑ Q109
