network’s importance.[1] Contributors pushed for the Government to invest in “network analysis tools and systems”, to better understand and respond to organisations like the Wagner Network.[2]
44. Sanctions are one tool that the UK Government uses to respond to the Wagner Network, with 39 geographic and thematic regimes for making designations.[3] Sanctions can include asset freezes (for individuals and entities), trust services sanctions[4] (for individuals and entities) and travel bans (for individuals). The Minister told us in February that that UK sanctions against Wagner have “focused on high-impact targets and disrupting its overall network”; the Government is “considering further sanctions,” but makes it “a matter of policy not to speculate on whether or not we are considering specific cases.”[5]There are now 150 staff members in the FCDO’s Sanctions Taskforce (“treble its previous number”), as well as many others in Government who work “substantially or partially on sanctions policy and implementation.”[6]
45. According to the Dossier Center, identifying and sanctioning all Wagner-linked individuals and entities is “almost impossible”, due to the “efforts employed by [Prigozhin’s] staff to disguise their activities and companies”.[7] The sanctions process is “comparatively slow” relative to the time needed to register a new company,[8] and Prigozhin’s affiliates have “managed to evade sanctions through continuous turnover”.[9] Wagner operatives have also changed their names to avoid sanctions, and there is evidence that officials of at least one host government have assisted Wagner-linked individuals to register companies in a way that obscures their true connection.[10]
46. The Government told us at the end of February that it had sanctioned Yevgeny Prigozhin, as well as a further seven Wagner-linked individuals, including Dmitri Utkin, commanders in Syria and officials supporting Wagner recruitment in Russian prisons.[11] To understand the level of sanctioning of Wagner actors, we compared and analysed the official sanctions lists of the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union,
- ↑ “…it is easy to overstate their success. […] I think it is easy to overstate their growing impact […] they are very definitely a global force for bad and instability, but at the same time, we mustn’t assign them too much success...” Q109
- ↑ Protection Approaches (WGN0024) para 4.1: “Network analysis brings to light the full spectrum of actors that enable the perpetration of violence, including supply chains, human trafficking networks, the arms trade, media outlets, armed groups, and communities themselves. Network analysis allows actors to target those weak spots – be they the financial flows of private companies such as the Wagner group, their communication systems, or other forms of enablement. Such analysis of private and proxy armed actors should inform the application of travel bans; sanctions; accountability the design of programming; and wider strategy.” See similar points within The Sentry (WGN0017) para 27
- ↑ Correspondence with the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (Europe) following up on the FAC evidence session on 6 February 2023, dated 28/02/2023 and 09/02/2023
- ↑ Since 21 March 2023, the Government has also used ‘trust services sanctions’ to make it harder for specific sanctioned individuals and entities to access services that would reduce the impact of sanctions on them. OFSI, ‘Trust Services Sanctions update’, 21 March 2023 (accessed 17 July 2023)
- ↑ Correspondence with the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (Europe) following up on the FAC evidence session on 6 February 2023, dated 28/02/2023 and 09/02/2023
- ↑ The others working on this include: “others across the FCDO in our overseas network, Trade Directorate, geographic and thematic directorates and others across Government”. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (WGN0025) section 5
- ↑ Dossier Center (WGN0009) para 57
- ↑ Dossier Center (WGN0009) para 54
- ↑ Dossier Center (WGN0009) para 43
- ↑ Dossier Center (WGN0009) paras 55–56
- ↑ Correspondence with the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (Europe) following up on the FAC evidence session on 6 February 2023, dated 28/02/2023 and 09/02/2023
