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36
Guns for gold:the Wagner Network exposed

as of 7 July 2023.230[1] We identified 44 individuals and 37 entities that had been sanctioned—in one or more of these three jurisdictions—for their direct connection to the Wagner Network, or for relevant activities in support of Prigozhin.[2] According to our analysis (presented in Appendix 1), the UK has sanctioned Wagner-linked targets at a lower rate than either the EU or the US. Specifically:

  • Among the individuals identified, the UK has sanctioned 15 of 44, i.e. around one in three (34%). In comparison, the US has sanctioned 61% and the EU 68%.
  • Among the entities identified, the UK has sanctioned 5 out of these 37 (13.5% sanctioning rate). By comparison, the EU has sanctioned 16 of these entities (43%) and the US has sanctioned 30 (81%).

Beyond these 44 individuals and 37 entities, the UK may have applied sanctions to additional targets, without making clear their association to the Wagner Network or to Prigozhin when doing so. When questioned on this point, the Minister appeared unsure as to why the UK may have sanctioned fewer individuals and entities than the US and EU, suggesting it may be because they are “larger”.[3] He added:

We work with our allies. If you have a list there that you think we should be seeing, I imagine that that list will be considered by our sanctions team.[4]

Beyond these 44 individuals and 37 entities, the UK may have applied sanctions to additional targets, without making clear their association to the Wagner Network or to Prigozhin when doing so. When questioned on this point, the Minister appeared unsure as to why the UK may have sanctioned fewer individuals and entities than the US and EU, suggesting it may be because they are “larger”.[5] He added:

In subsequent correspondence, the Minister disputed that the UK has sanctioned fewer people than the United States. However, the supporting statistics he provided referred to individuals sanctioned under the wider Russia sanctions regime, rather than those sanctioned specifically for their role within the Wagner Network.[6] Appendix 1 provides our own list for the FCDO’s consideration. We acknowledge that there are specific reasons why the UK may have sanctioned at a lower rate than these allies.[7]

47. The Government further implied that its limited sanctioning of specific Wagner-linked entities is irrelevant. It stated that its designation of the ‘Wagner Group’ in 2022 automatically freezes the assets of entities that the Wagner Group owns or controls.[8]


  1. UK Government, The UK Sanctions List (ODT format accessed 7 July 2023); Office of Foreign Assets Control, Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, 29 June 2023 (PDF accessed 7 July 2023); separate EU decisions (see Appendix 1).
  2. This is a non-exhaustive list. It is challenging to count all the sanctions that the UK and its partners have applied to ‘Wagner-linked’ individuals and entities. Some individuals and entities linked to the Wagner Network may be sanctioned for other reasons, beyond this association.
  3. Qq150-151
  4. Qq158
  5. Qq150-151
  6. Correspondence with the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (Europe) following up on the FAC evidence session on 6 February 2023, dated 28/02/2023 and 09/02/2023. It is possible that there is overlap between those sanctioned under the Russia regime and those within in the Wagner Network, even if the Wagner links are not explicit in their designation.
  7. A challenge may be information-sharing. “If, for example, the US or another G7 counterpart has imposed sanctions, they will often do it based on their own analysis. Some of that analysis will be able to be shared across borders; some of it will not, to protect individuals who have provided the evidence. What you have within a sanctions designation, in general, is what is available if it goes to public scrutiny or into a court scrutiny environment. You also have the evidence underneath that, and sometimes the evidence cannot be shared across borders. That has, in the past, proved to be an issue in imposing multilateral sanctions.” Oral evidence taken on 8 March 2022, HC (2021–22) 1089, Q79 [Dr Walker]
  8. “By designating Wagner Group, our asset freeze also applies to any other entity it owns or controls. The US has designated a number of entities that it considers controlled by Wagner Group; entities controlled by Wagner are already subject to a UK asset freeze through our ownership and control provisions”. Correspondence with the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (Europe) following up on the FAC evidence session on 6 February 2023, dated 28/02/2023 and 09/02/2023