to benefit from access to the UK’s financial markets. The lack of certainty about this denotes a scandalous failure to exercise due diligence. At its worst, this could mean the UK is inadvertently undermining the efforts of our allies.
57. The Minister had no specific knowledge of work within his Department to analyse whether Wagner activities undermine the financial impact of UK sanctions on the Russian war machine. Despite finding it “likely”, he could not confirm that the FCDO had had any input to HM Treasury’s unwise decision to issue sanctions waivers to Prigozhin. Despite assuring us that the Treasury and FCDO communicate over sanctions waivers in general, the Minister himself had not received any official advice specifically on sanctions waivers. Given his position as the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Europe, we would expect him to have an interest and role in questions relating to sanctions waivers linked to Russia and Ukraine. His statements also lead us to question whether the Russia Unit is providing the necessary join-up between the FCDO and Treasury, given the central role of sanctions as a tool of UK foreign policy.
58. We recommend that the Government move faster and harder in sanctioning Wagner-linked individuals and entities. Specifically, it should:
- a) Sanction all individuals and entities provided in Appendix 1, which the United States and European Union have already targeted but which the UK has not;
- b) Consider bringing forth sanctions on civilian enablers and corporate ‘frontmen’ for the network’s activities; and
- c) Close enforcement gaps.
59. We recommend that the Government establishes a specific and regular mechanism for coordinating with the United States and the European Union over Wagner-linked sanctions; it should report back to us on what these mechanisms are, and how frequently and effectively they are being used.
60. We further recommend that the Government prioritises introducing and enforcing travel bans for Wagner-linked individuals as a likely deterrent to involvement in the network, in particular working with Turkey, a popular holiday destination for Russians.
61. In the public interest, we have compiled Wagner-linked names that are already a matter of public record, as identified via our commissioned open-source research (see Appendix 2). In doing so, we hope to challenge the mystique that the Wagner Network cultivated in many countries, make it as difficult as possible for it to operate, create a deterrent effect, and enable the Government to improve its apparently limited understanding of the network. We implore the Government to urgently assess these names and impose sanctions on these individuals and entities if the necessary threshold is met.
Carrot and stick diplomacy
If we do not turn up and work with allies […]—if we do not show up and stay active—then certainly, proxies of this nature do see an opportunity[1]
- ↑ Q232 [Leo Docherty]
